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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUPREME COURT SCOPE OF
REVIEW-STATE SOVEREIGNTY V. COURT
PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The validity of a state felony arrest without a warrant is an
issue that has been much litigated, and its resolution is of increasing importance. Because of the many instances where an
arrest must be made without a warrant and because of the danger
of tainting the evidence seized if the arrest is adjudged illegal,'
it is imperative that the standards used to determine the validity
of such an arrest be clearly stated. Despite this need for clear
and definite rules, a cloud of doubt and speculation hovers over
this area. Rules have been promulgated, but they lack certainty

and are difficult to apply to specific factual situations.
Like most questions of individual rights and freedoms, the
problem of a valid arrest arises from the interpretations given
to the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment applies alike
to questions of arrest as well as search and seizure. 2 They have
further held that the freedoms guaranteed by the fourth amendment are an essential element in the concept of ordered liberty,
and, as such, are entitled to the protection of the fourteenth
amendment against illegal state action. 3 In order to insure this
protection, the Court has indicated its intent to make an independent examination of the facts in each case that alleges a violation of constitutional freedoms. 4
Before discussing the specific problems of felony arrests without a warrant, it may be beneficial to trace the general develop* Beck v. Ohio (Sup. Ct 1964).
1. Both federal and state courts must exclude from a trial all evidence that
was illegally obtained. When incident to a valid arrest even without a warrant,
seized evidence is admissible. However, where the arrest is invalid, the subsequent search and seizure is also invalid, and any evidence acquired thereby must
be excluded as "fruits of the poisonous tree." The federal exclusionary rule

was established by Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). It was not
until 1961 that the states were subjected to the same requirement by Mapp. v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

2. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
3. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Accord, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.

643 (1961).
4. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).

553

Published by Scholar Commons, 1964

1

SouTH CARoLINA LAW REYV EW

[Vol. 17

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1964], Art. 9

ment of constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court as they
affect state actions in the criminal field.
II. Is STAT SovEREiN~TY BEING SACRIFICED?

By holding in Tolf v. Colorado5 that the fourth amendment
was applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court initiated an inquiry into two separate,
but related, areas. First, in determining whether a case met the
fundamental constitutional criteria required by the fourteenth
amendment, how close would the Court come to making a de novo
review? Second, to what extent did the Court intend to interfere
with state rules and decisions?
A. Enlargement of the Supreme Court's Socope of Review
The Court has frequently stated the rules of review to which
it adheres. While it is within their province to determine whether
a state court's finding is supported by sufficient evidence, such
an inquiry is generally limited to the undisputed sections of the
record." Any conflict is presumed to come to the Supreme Court
authoritatively resolved by the state's adjudication.' This rule
of noninterference applies to cases where the conflict is in the
evidence and to cases where the conflict is in the factual inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. That is,
where the conclusions depend on an appreciation of facts and
circumstances which admit of different interpretations, the conclusions of the lower court will be accepted. 8 Further, where the
evidence is not in the record, or where only part of the evidence
is present, the presumption is that it was sufficient to sustain
the judgment. 9
While it appears that these rules of appellate review are well
established, where a violation of constitutional rights is alleged,
there is a tendency in the Supreme Court to approach each case
de novo. In dealing with a question of constitutionality the court
must determine if the action, whether state or federal, was rea5. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
6. See Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 402 (1958) ; Pollock v. Williams,
322 U.S. 4 (1944); Johnson Oil & Ref. Co. v. State ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S.
158 (1933) ; Berdler v. South Carolina Tax Comn'n, 282 U.S. 1 (1930).
7. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).

8. See General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944);
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287
(1940); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Lowell, 151 U.S. 209 (1894).
9. International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934).
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sonable in light of constitutional guarantees. As early as 1931
the Court stated that there was no formula for the determination
of reasonableness and that each case was to be decided on its own
facts and circumstances. 10 The Court reasoned that the only way
they could determine whether the constitutional requirements
had been met was to look at the particular facts of each case.
It would be impossible for the Court to accept the state court's
findings of fact in toto because of the restrictions it would place
on the Court's duty to uphold the Constitution.11 Thus, the only
feasible approach was for the Court to review the state court's
determination of the issues, and obviously this could not be
accomplished without an independent examination of the facts
and circumstances of each case. Such an examination borders
closely on de novo review.
How close the Court's review is to de novo review depends on
the extent to which they intend to carry on their independent
determinations. Recently, in Ker v. California12 the Court has
attempted to define the limits of their review. Mr. Justice Clark,
speaking for eight members of the Court, stated that it would be
impossible to lay down a fixed formula to apply in specific cases;
rather, the Court will be met with the recurring questions of
reasonableness. 13 In attempting to strike a balance between deference to lower court findings and independent review by the
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Clark stated that the question of
reasonableness is to be determined first by the trial court, and
their findings will be accorded the usual weight.-4 However,
he then indicated that while the findings of reasonableness are
in the first instance for the trial court, they will be respected
by the Supreme Court only insofar as they are consistent with
federal constitutional guarantees. Mr. Justice Clark indicated
that when it was necessary to the determination of constitutional
rights, the Court would make a thorough and independent examination of the facts to determine whether the trial court had respected the "fundamental" or "constitutional" criteria. 5
10. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
11. [T]his Court cannot allow itself to be completely bound by a state court
determination of any issue essential to the decision of a claim of federal
right, in view of the fact that the federal law could then be frustrated by
distorted fact finding...

Stein v. People, 346 U.S. 156, 181 (1953).

12. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
13. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963).
14. Id. at 31-32, quoting excerpts from Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653

(1961).
15. Id. at 34.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1964

3

LAW
[Vol.
SouthSOUTr
CarolinaCAROLINA
Law Review,
Vol.REvw[
17, Iss. 4 [1964], Art.
9 17

B. Supreme Court Criteria-FromWhat Source?
In addition to the Court's general power of review over state
court cases, it has a supervisory authority over proceedings originating in federal courts, 16 and as a necessary adjunct to this
supervisory authority, the Court has formulated specific requirements that a federal arrest must meet when its constitutionality
is questioned in a federal jurisdiction. The Court has frequently
indicated that these requirements are more stringent than those
used when state jurisdictions are involved.17 The Supreme Court
has stated that in order for a state arrest to be adjudged valid, it
must meet the fundamental criteria established by the fourteenth
amendment. This fundamental criteria was not considered to
arise from the same sources as the supervisory requirements applied to federal actions. However, while the supervisory requirements were set out in specific written rules, fundamental criteria
was merely a concept devoid of tangibility. Wolf and later
cases raised the question of whether it was possible that the
stricter federal requirements would be applied by the Court in
making its independent determination of the facts in a state case.
Previously, the review of a state case had not included an independent review of the facts and circumstances, and it appeared
that as the Court began this new task, it would have to turn
somewhere for standards to judge whether the events challenged
on appeal met the fundamental criteria. What easier place to
turn, intentionally or subconsciously, than to the familiar and
specific federal standards. This possibility appeared more likely
when Mapp v. Ohio18 was decided. There, in dealing with the
exclusionary rule, 19 the Court held that the fourth amendment
was enforceable against the states by the same sanction of exelusion as is used against the federal government, by applying
the same constitutional standards.20 Later in Ker the Court attempted to deny this possibility and to clarify the distinction
between state sovereignty (with which the Supreme Court will
not interfere), fundamental criteria (which the Court is bound
16. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). Accord, Miller v. United

States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); Nardone v. United States, 303 U.S. 379 (1937).
17. [F]astidious regard for the honor of the administration of justice requires
the Court to make certain that the doing of justice be made so manifest
that only irrational and perverse claims of its disregard can be asserted.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 124

(1956).
18. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19. Supra note 1.
20. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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to protect), and the more stringent rules resulting from their
supervisory authority. Recognizing that the rules governing federal criminal trials went beyond basic constitutional principles
because of the Court's supervisory authority, Mr. Justice Clark
assured that in Mapp v. Ohio the Supreme Court did not establish its assumption of supervisory authority over state courts.
Rather, both federal and state courts must respect the same fundamental criteria in their approaches. Mr. Justice Clark stated
that it would be impossible to lay down fixed formulas that
could be applied in specific cases, and he admitted that the Court
would be met with "recurring questions of reasonableness" when
21
dealing with state cases.

C. The Unanswered Questions

The interrelation of the two basic questions is easily seen. The
Court must distinguish between the standards they use regarding
state sovereignty, fundamental criteria, and supervisory requirements. At the same time, they must review all cases to determine
if the constitutional requirements have been met. The only way
to make such a finding is by an independent determination of
the facts and circumstances of each case. Such an independent
review invades the concept of state sovereignty, but without it
the Court feels it cannot protect an individual's constitutional
rights. Further, once their independent determination takes
place, the problem of standards arises. If the Court applies federal standards to test constitutionality, the important distinction
between state and federal cases, that is between fundamental
criteria and supervisory authority, will be eliminated. The difficult question, therefore, is whether in the long run the state
courts will be held to the same standards as the federal courts.
A definite answer to this question has not been given. In Ker
the Court attempted to answer it in the negative by saying that
they had not assumed supervisory authority over state courts.
But they appear to contradict this position by stating in the same
case that both federal and state courts must respect the same
fundamental criteria in their approaches, 22 and that the Court
cannot establish fixed formulas to apply in each case but must
meet the recurring question of reasonableness. 23 They further
21. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31-32 (1963), quoting in part from Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961).
22. Id. at 31-32.
23. Ibid.
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stated that while reasonableness is first for the trial court to
determine, the Supreme Court would make an independent examination to determine for itself whether the fundamental criteria
estabZished by this Court have been respected.2 4 The Court's language indicates that the standards used under the fourth amendment, i.e., federal actions, and under the fourteenth amendment,
i.e., state actions, will tend to be the same, 25 at least when reasonableness is at issue. It further indicates that the standards used
by the Supreme Court in their review of other aspects of state
criminal activities will be quite similar to the federal requirements. Consequently, in cases of arrests without a warrant, the
result would be that federal and state officers have the same
grounds for probable cause before the arrest will be considered
valid. Beck v. Ohio" indicates that the standards will be the
same in federal and state cases. It further shows the extent to
which the Court is willing to go in its de novo review in order
to insure the protection of constitutional rights.

III. BEC v. OHIO, A MOU TAIN OR A Moim-KII
A. The Case
The petitioner, William Beck, was driving his car in the vicinity of East 115th Street and Beulah Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio.
Cleveland police officers approached him, identified themselves,
and asked him to pull over. The officers had neither arrest nor
search warrant. However, after placing Beck under arrest, they
searched his car. Finding nothing incriminating, they took Beck
to a nearby police station where a more thorough search turned
up a number of clearing house slips 27 in his sock. After a hearing, his motion to suppress the slips as evidence was denied, and
he was convicted of violating a state criminal statute.28 The
conviction was affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeals and by
the Ohio Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the clearing house slips
had been seized in violation of the fourth and fourteenth
amendments.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 31-32, 34.
Agular v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964).
85 Sup. Ct. 223 (1964).
OrO REv. CoD- §2915.11 (Anderson 1953) states that possession of

clearing house, i.e., numbers game, tickets is punishable by fine and imprisonment. Such a penalty would thus make the crime a felony.

28. Ibid.
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The record on the writ of certiorari contained only the testimony of one of the arresting officers given at the hearing on
the motion to suppress the clearing house slips as evidence. This
testimony revealed that at the time of the arrest the officer had
a police picture of Beck, knew what he looked like, and knew
that he had a record in connection with clearing house slips.
Further, it showed that the officer had testified that someone
had given him information concerning Beck's allegedly illegal
activities and that he knew who that person was. The officer
stated that when he left the station house, he had in mind looking for Beck in the area of East 115th Street and Beulah and
stopping Beck if he saw him make a stop in that area. 29
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court which
reversed the conviction in a six to three decision. Proceeding on
the premise that if the arrest was legal the subsequent search
would be upheld, he stated that the validity of the arrest in turn
depended on whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the
officers had probable cause to make it.30 The Court found that
the facts, as stated in the record, were not sufficient to constitute
probable cause and that the arrest did not meet the demands of
31
the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
B. Standards Used and the Federal-State Distinction
The Court in Beck held that whether probable cause was present depended on whether, at the moment the arrest was made,
the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge were
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that Beck had
committed or was committing an offense.3 2 They then quoted
38
from Brinegarv. United States.
The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found
for accommodating . . . often opposing interests. Requiring
29. Beck v. Ohio, 85 Sup. Ct. 223, 227 (1964).
30. The requirement of probable cause for arrest without a warrant stems
from the fourth amendment provision that no warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause. The Court takes the position as stated in Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), that the requirements for an arrest without a
warrant can be no less stringent than where a warrant is obtained.
31. Beck v. Ohio, 85 Sup. Ct. 223, 226 (1964).
32. Id. at 225. Justice Stewart cited Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
(1949) and Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) in support of this
statement.

33. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less
would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the
34
officer's whim or caprice.
Mr. Justice Clark joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in Beck. However, they did not criticize
either the standards used to determine probable cause or the
source from which these standards were taken, implying that
they were in accord on these points. It indicates that these
standards and their source are viewed by the entire Court as
manifestations of fundamental criteria.
The Ker case distinguished between fundamental criteria and
supervisory authority, but the question remained as to what
extent the Court would rely on federal precedents when deciding
whether a state arrest met the constitutional requirements of
probable cause. By relying on cases involving federal agents as
the source for their standards, Beek supplied a possible answer.
Since both Brinegar and Henry v. United States3 5 dealt with
federal arrests, their use by Mr. Justice Stewart in Beck indicates
that the Court is prepared to abandon the federal-state distinction when applying constitutional standards. Neither dissent
attacked this position, indicating their accord with this abandonment of the federal-state distinction.
Later in the decision this conclusion finds further support
when Mr. Justice Stewart discusses the qualifications on the general rule that information supplied to an officer by an informer
may establish probable cause. Again he cites only cases involving
federal agents. He quoted Wong Sun v. United States, 36 a case
involving arrests by federal narcotics agents.
Whether or not the requirements of reliability and particularity of the information on which an officer may act
are more stringent when an arrest warrant is absent, they
surely cannot be less stringent than where an arrest warrant
37
is obtained.
The informer must be known to the officer and he must be reliable, as is usually indicated by having given information in the
past which proved accurate.3 8 It has been held that where the
34. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
35. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
36. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
37. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 480 (1963).
38. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) ; Costello v. United States,
324 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 930 (1963).
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informer is reliable, the officer may act solely on information
obtained from that source.8 9 The information that is received
must be specific. It must indicate a certain person involved in a
certain crime or a certain person planning to commit a crime at
a certain time and place. 40
In applying the rule to Beck's arrest, these were the limitations
to which the Court adhered. Justice Stewart stated that the
record did not indicate what information had been received, i.e.,
whether it was specific as to time and place, or from what source
it had come, i.e., whether the source was reliable. This arrest was
compared with the arrest in Draper v. United States,41 another
case involving an arrest by a federal narcotics agent. It was
found that the Beck record did not contain any facts to support
the officer's belief that Beck was engaged in criminal activity
when they arrested him. "The arresting officer said no more
than that someone [he did not say whom] had told him something [he did not say what] about the petitioner." 42
C. Ohio's Syllabus Rule-A Peculiar Prooblem for the Court
Prior decisions, such as Mapp and Ker, had recognized the
impossibility of establishing fixed formulas of reasonableness
and indicated the need for the Court to scrutinize the facts, the
findings, and the record of each case to determine whether the
constitutional criteria had been met. No doubt such scrutiny in
the Beck case proved to be more difficult than the Court had
hoped when they adopted this view. Here, the trial court made
no findings of fact, the judge merely stating that a lawful arrest
had been made and that the search was incident thereto. The
court of appeals merely found that no prejudicial error had been
made. In the Ohio Supreme Court, Judge Zimmerman's opinion
contained a narrative recital of the facts, but the majority of
the United States Supreme Court chose to ignore this recital
and use only the meager record in its search for probable cause.
39. Costello v. United States, 324 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 930 (1963).
40. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Further, there is a privilege to conceal an informer's identity unless disclosure is relevant to the accused's defense or is essential
to a fair determination of the cause. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53
(1957). However, the grounds on which the informer's reliability is based must
be indicated.
41. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
42. Beck v. Ohio, 85 Sup. Ct 223, 228 (1964).
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The problem arises because of a rule that is peculiar to the
Ohio Supreme Court. Ohio's syllabus rule43 provides that when
a case is decided, the judge assigned to deliver the opinion shall
also write a syllabus of the decision, which will contain only the
points of law that were determined by the court.4 4 On its face
it would appear that the syllabus is the only significant part
of the case, and that the accompanying opinion, as the one written by Judge Zimmerman, must be disregarded, or at most
treated as dictum. This is the position taken by the majority of
the United States Supreme Court in Beek, relying on a prior
Ohio case which held that individual opinions merely speak the
45
conclusions of their writer.

However, the majority of cases dealing with the acceptability
of the accompanying opinion lead to a different conclusion. In
Perkins v. Bright46 the Ohio court recognized statements from
the accompanying opinion of the previous case as controlling on
the disposition of that case and the case before them. The court
then quoted In r"e Poage,47 another Ohio case, which stated that
each syllabus must be read in light of the findings of fact in that
particular case since it would be impossible for the court to comprehend in each syllabus all the many phases of facts that may
arise in other cases touching similar areas. 48 The syllabus must
be interpreted with reference to the facts upon which it is predicated and the questions presented to and considered by the Ohio
court.

49

Both dissenting opinions contended that the majority erred in
not considering this accompanying opinion, and that if it had
been considered, probable cause for the arrest could have been
found. After citing the Ohio cases previously mentioned, Mr.
Justice Clark, joined by Mr. Justice Black, declared that reasonably supportable facts determined by the highest court of a state
should stand. In a separate dissent Mr. Justice Harlan agreed
that the accompanying opinion should have been considered.
Proceeding on the premise that the United States Supreme Court
43. OHio Sup. CT. R. 6.
44. Ibid.

45. Thackery v. Helfrich, 123 Ohio St. 334, 336, 175 N.E. 449, 450 (1931).
46. 109 Ohio St. 14, 141 N.E. 689 (1923).
47. 87 Ohio St. 72, 100 N.E. 125 (1922).
48. In re Poage, 87 Ohio St. 72, 100 N.E. 125 (1922) as quoted in Perkins
v. Bright, 109 Ohio St. 14, 141 N.E. 689, 690 (1923).
49. Williamson Heater Co. v. Radich, 128 Ohio St. 124, 125, 190 N.E. 403,
404 (1934). Accord, Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 189 N.E.2d 857
(1963).
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would have considered findings of fact made by the trial court,
he stated that although Judge Zimmerman's opinion articulated
the finding in question, this finding must be attributed to the
trial court because the Court must assume that Judge Zimmerman's conclusion that the arrest was constitutionally permissible
was based on the factual findings necessary to support it.5O Thus,
the Court did not argue over the nature of probable cause standards that should be applied, but rather over the source from
which the facts should be taken in determining -whether the
standards had been met.
The Ohio Supreme Court syllabus for the Beek case stated
that a search without a warrant is not unlawful where the officer
has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed
and that articles seized during such a search are properly admissible into evidence at the trial. On the question of whether an
informer must be named, the syllabus stated that it was not reversible error for the trial court to refuse to order the disclosure
of the informer's identity where such disclosure would not be
helpful to the accused in making his defense. 1 In his accompanying opinion Judge Zimmerman disclosed the facts upon which
the Ohio Supreme Court apparently based its syllabus decision.
He stated that the Cleveland police had good reason to believe
that Beck was regularly involved in a gambling operation and
that there had been testimony as to his previous convictions for
this crime. Further, the police had been given information by an
informer that Beck would be in a certain locality at a certain
time pursuing his unlawful activities. He was found in that
52
locality, as predicted.
D. Enlarged Scope of Review Used in the Beek Case
Judge Zimmerman's opinion indicates that there was no lack
of common understanding at Beck's trial that the informer had
given the officer the crucial information. According to the usual
standards of review, any conflict as to inferences that could have
been drawn should have been deemed resolved at the state level.
WVhile it is clear that in cases involving asserted violations of
constitutional rights the Court is free to draw its own inferences
from the established facts, the Court has stated that it does not
50. Beck v. Ohio, 85 Sup. Ct. 223, 230 n. 1 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
51. State v. Beck, 175 Ohio St. 73, 191 N.E.2d 825 (1963).

52. Id. at 75, 191 N.E.2d at 827.
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Rather, the fourteenth amendment presents the most far reaching and most frequent federal basis of challenging state criminal
justice. Thus, when the Court reviews a state decision under
a claim based on the fourteenth amendment, the state's responsibilities for enforcing its criminal law must be kept in mind, and
the Court must exercise with due humility its merely negative
function.5 4 As Mr. Justice Harlan stated in his dissenting
opinion:
The distinction between facts and inferences may often
be difficult to draw, but the guiding principle for this
Court should be that when a question is in doubt and contemporaneous understandings have a part to play in its
resolution, the Court should be slow to upset the state court's
inferential findings.5 5
Judge Zimmerman's opinion definitely stated the role that the
informer had played in bringing about Beck's arrest. But even
if his opinion is not considered, sufficient facts are present in
the record (which the Court did consider) or could be inferred
to lead to the conclusion that the probable cause standards had
been met. The officer testified that he received information
from a known informer and then set out to find Beck at a
specific locality. It can be inferred from this testimony that
the information he received told him that Beck would be in a
certain locality pursuing his illegal activity. It was never specifically stated that the informer had previously reliable information, but the fact that he was referred to as a known informer
is some indication that the officer had had previous dealings
with him.
The record also stated that when asked on what basis he had
probable cause to stop Beck, the officer replied, "information
and previous record and observation." 56 Draper v. United
States 7 was used by the majority as the main precedent for
denying the presence of probable cause in Beck's arrest. There,
an informer told police that Draper was to alight from a train
on one of two days, described how he would be dressed, and
stated that he would be carrying narcotics. The federal narcotics
53. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).
54. Rochin v. People, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952).
55. Beck v. Ohio, 85 Sup. Ct. 223, 230 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
56. Id. at 231.
57. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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agent who made the arrest did not know Draper and had only a
picture by which to make an identification. The informer's tip
was the only reason the agent had to suspect Draper was engaged
in unlawful activity. The Court sustained the conviction stating
that when the agent saw Draper alight from the train as the
informer said he would and Draper fit the description given
by the informer, the agent had personally verified the information and thus had probable cause to arrest. Thus, the Court inferred that the personal verification eliminated the need for a
previously reliable informer. In the Beck case the record indicated that the officers were given accurate and specific information as to the identity of the criminal, the nature of the offense,
and the time and place of its occurrence. This information was
received from a known informer. The officers knew Beck and
were aware of his previous record. It would seem that when they
saw Beck in the predicted locality, they had personally verified
the information given to them. They still could not be sure that
Beck had the clearing house slips, just as the federal agent still
was not sure that Draper was carrying narcotics. However, as
the Court viewed the situation in Draper,since all the other information had been personally verified, there were reasonable
grounds to believe that the remaining unverified piece of information was likewise true. 58 In no case is an officer required to
be absolutely sure that a crime has been committed before he can
make an arrest. He need only have a probable cause to so believe.
The Court has frequently stated that when handling a probable
cause question, they are dealing, as the name implies, with probabilities. These are not technical requirements, but rather, "they
are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. 5
Where the highest court of a state affirms a judgment of conviction entered by the state trial court, the judgment before the
Supreme Court for review is the judgment which the highest
state court made on the record before it and not the action of
the state trial court.60 If the judgment being considered was that
rendered by the Ohio Supreme Court, at least the usual weight
should be given to the facts they used to support their findings.
The syllabus holding seems to be a weak way to deny consideration of the Zimmerman opinion. The weight of authority sup58. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
59. Id. at 333.

60. Wolfe v. State, 364 U.S. 177, 194-95 (1960).
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ports the view that the syllabus must be read in light of the
facts, even when these facts are brought out in the accompanying
opinion. On previous occasions the Supreme Court agreed with
this authority and considered the accompanying opinion. 61
While the Court has stated its intent to make an independent
examination of the facts, findings, and record to determine if
the fundamental criteria have been respected, they also indicated
that findings made by state courts would be given the usual
weight and that reasonableness is to be determined in the first
instance by the trial court.62 Beck took the position that since
the appellate opinion was not equivalent to findings made by
the trial court, the Court would consider the record de novo.
They did not give any consideration to prior holdings, nor did
they fill in any gaps in the record by drawing inferences favorable to the state.
Ker indicated the intent to make independent examinations
and Beck stated that the reason for this type of review stemmed
from the belief that the Court would not be able to provide full
protection for constitutional rights unless it could freely and
63
completely redetermine the facts involved in each case.
That there have been, and still are, critics of this type of review is shown by the dissents in Beek. Mr. Justices Clark and
Black warn that if the Court fails to recognize determinations
made by the state courts, the Supreme Court will continually be
involved in disputes with lower courts over the minutiae of facts
present in every case. Mr. Justice Harlan believes that when the
feel of a case may have been an important element in deciding an
issue which is unclear on the record, the lower court was in a
better position to determine whether a constitutional right had
been infringed. Thus, the Supreme Court's independent judgment should yield to this greater capacity of the trial court. Such
an approach is essential if the dual nature of our judicial system
is to be maintained.
However, the majority of the Court seem firmly convinced
that de novo review is the only trustworthy way to insure the
protection of constitutional freedoms. Beek indicates the strength
of this conviction, because here, the Court disputed the findings
sua sponte. No attack had been leveled at them by the petitioner.
He raised no question as to the source or content of the informa61. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
62. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961).
63. Beck v. Ohio, 85 Sup. Ct. 223, 230 (1964).
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64

tion that had led to his arrest. Rather, the Court took it upon
itself to view the record with an open mind and question anything that was not clearly explained.
Assuming that the Court will not be disposed to change its
position concerning scope of review, a valuable lesson can be
learned from the Beek case. Herein Mr. Justice Stewart remarked that when the constitutionality of the arrest was questioned it was incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate with
extreme specificity exactly what the informer said and why the
officer thought the information was credible. Since the Court has
indicated that it will not draw inferences from the facts presented in the record, that it will rely solely on the record, and
that it will not be bound by lower court findings, care should be
taken to see that the record is complete and accurate in its report
of the case. Such a step is in lieu of meeting the Court head on in
a dispute over appellate scope of review.
Beck further indicates that the Court's standards for a valid
arrest are derived from federal court precedents and federal
rules standards. Thus, in establishing arrest procedures, it would
be wise for state officials to keep in mind the requirements to
which federal agents must adhere. If this is done, it is likely that
a great many more state court convictions will be upheld on
appeal.
MARY JO SoTrf

64. Judge Zimmerman indicated that Beck had "made no actual defense and

by stipulation the cause was submitted to the Court solely on evidence furnished by police and introduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress."

State v. Beck, 175 Ohio St. 73, 76, 191 N.E.2d 825, 828 (1963).
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CRIMINAL LAW-FEDERAL ESCAPE ACT-WHAT
CUSTODY NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE
ESCAPE A CRIME*
In November of 1964, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
handed down the decision of Frazier v. United States,' a case
which involved the interpretation of the words "custody of the
Attorney General" found within the Federal Escape Act.2 Cases
interpreting this act have not been particularly numerous, but
the wide divergence of opinion and the general confusion that
has resulted make this case worthy of comment.
Leroy Frazier was convicted of narcotics violations and placed
in the custody of the United States Attorney General. He was
subsequently transferred to Saint Elizabeths Hospital pursuant
to a statute which authorized the director of the department of
corrections to make such a transfer if a prisoner is found to be
mentally ill. Frazier escaped from the hospital and was convicted
of violating the Federal Escape Act for escaping from the custody of the Attorney General. He appealed, contending that his
escape was not from the "custody of the Attorney General," and
therefore not a violation of the Federal Escape Act. The majority found that the "custody" intended was not limited to
actual physical control but denoted a type of legal or constructive custody. Thus, the Attorney General would retain custody
even though the prisoner was assigned to an institution over
which the Department of Justice had no control. It would be a
continuous custody which followed the prisoner from one institution to another.
There was a vigorous dissent by Judge Fahy 3 who felt that
the Attorney General no longer had physical custody of the
appellant after he was transferred to an institution which was
not under his supervision, administration or control. Judge Fahy
felt that this was an escape from Saint Elizabeths Hospital and
not from the custody of the Attorney General. He pointed out
that there are other provisions of the Federal Escape Act applicable to an escape from an institution in which one has been confined by direction of the Attorney General, but that the appellant was not indicted under those provisions. Judge Fahy con* Frazier v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1964).
1. 339 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1964).

2. 18 U.S.C. §751 (1952).
3. Frazier v. United States, 339 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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tinues by reasoning that if this constructive custody remained
after the transfer of physical custody from the Attorney General to another department, then it would also remain after the
appellant's escape from Saint Elizabeths. He would be escaping
only from the hospital and not from the constructive custody of
the Attorney General which would follow him, and would preclude the escape from being an escape at all.
A. Escape-The Cgime and its Consequences
The Federal Escape Act in part provides:
Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of
the Attorney General or his authorized representative, or
from any institution in which he is confined by direction of
the Attorney General, or from any custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United
States by any court, judge, or commissioner, or from the
custody of an officer or employee of the United States pursuant to lawful arrest, shall, if the custody or confinement
is by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, or conviction
of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.

. ..

In United States v. BowO the Supreme Court stated some
of the more serious considerations leading to the adoption of
this statute:
Escapes and attempted escapes from penal institutions or
from official custody present a most serious problem of
penal discipline. They are often violent, menacing, as in the
instant case, lives of guards and custodians, and carry in
their wake other crimes attendant upon procuring money,
weapons, and transportation, and upon resisting recapture.6
The association of violence with the crime of escape is to be
expected. Escapees are desperate men concerned only with regaining their freedom. They have known imprisonment and are
fully aware of the punishment which awaits them upon apprehension.
The crime of escape has no special relationship to the crime
for which the prisoner is held.7 A misdemeanant in the process
4. 18 U.S.C. §751 (1952).
5. 333 U.S. 18 (1948).
6. Id. at 21 n. 5, quoting from the government's brief.
7. United States v. Person, 223 F. Supp. 982, 985 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
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of escaping is equally as dangerous as an escaping felon. It is
also apparent that length of time served and duration of sentence remaining bear no relationship to the creation of danger
and that the propriety of confinement is also irrelevant to the
offense. These considerations produce the holding that a prisoner
cannot test the correctness of his confinement by means of an
escape."
It would seem that the purpose of the Federal Escape Act is
to prevent these evils and not to punish the failure of a physically free man to return to his jailers.9 It logically follows that
custody of some sort is required as an element of the offense.
Calabriav. State' ° held that the state owes the duty of careful,
efficient and effective care and treatment to patients at a hospital for epileptics and that the state would not be justified in
keeping the patients under such conditions of restraint that a
mere absence without leave would constitute an escape. The
court stated that the use of the word "escape" presupposes restricted confinement.
A broad definition of escape is the voluntary departure of a
prisoner from the limits of his custody.' Custody consists of the
detention or restraint of a person against his will . 2s It entails

keeping the prisoner "either in actual confinement or surrounded
by physical force sufficient to restrain him from going at large
or obtaining more liberty than the law allows."' 3 Custody has
14
been held to mean nothing less than actual imprisonment.

B. Case Law-The Doctrine of Constructive Custody versus
Physical Custody
In the past the judiciary agreed with the requirement of physical custody. In Wilkes v. Blaughter15 the court held that cus8. See Lucas v. United States, 325 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1963); Godwin v.
United States, 185 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1950); Bayless v. United States, 141

F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1944).

9. United States v. Person, 223 F. Supp. 982, 985 (S.D. Cal. 1963).

10. 176 Misc. 925, 29 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1941).
11. See 19 An. JuR. Escape § 2 (1939) ; BLACK, LAW DIcioNARY 639 (4th
ed. 1951); 1 BouvIER, LAW DICTIONARY, RAWLES THIRD REvisioN 1068 (8th
ed. 1914; WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 871 (2d ed. (1963).

12. See BLACic, LAW DICTIONARY 460 (4th ed. 1951), and authorities there
cited.
13. 30 CJ.S. Escape §5 (1942).
14. Ex parte Powers, 129 Fed. 985 (W.D. Ky. 1904); Turner v. Wilson 49
Commonwealth, 59 Pa. 320 (1868).

Ind. 581 (1875); Smith v.
15. 10 N.C. 211 (1824).
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tody implies physical force, and the moment that force is withdrawn, there is no longer any legal custody; the prisoner becomes
a free agent. In Steere v. Fieldl6 where the prisoner had possession of the keys to all the doors both when the jailer was at the
jail and when he was at home, the court held that the prisoner
was not in custody even though he never left his place of imprisonment. And, in United States v. Hoffman 7 where men who
had been placed in jail were allowed to leave to go to the dentist
for all day visits and sometimes to go out at night without
guards, the court held that these men were not in the custody
of their jailer even though the prisoners always returned.
The court in Frazierrelied on three cases as precedents for the
novel expansion of the basic definition of custody. A review of
these cases clearly indicates that the idea of constructive custody
still retains the notion of some, although possibly slight, physical
detention.
In Giles v. United States' s the prisoner was sentenced to confinement in Alcatraz. He was performing, under general supervision, chores assigned to him on the island when he managed to
slip under the dock and into a supply boat while the guards were
looking the other way. His defense to a charge of escape under
the act was that he was not in the custody of the Attorney General, that the guard did not follow him around and keep him
under observation every moment. Faced with these facts the
Ninth Circuit held that even though the prisoner was not
watched every minute, he was still in custody within the meaning of the Federal Escape Act.
The factual situation of this case is extremely different from
that of the Frazier case. There, the prisoner was confined in a
mental hospital located in a large city. The aim of this institution was the care and treatment of its patients. In Giles, however, the prisoner was sentenced to confinement at the penitentiary on Alcatraz Island, an island whose sole purpose was the
imprisonment of criminals and which consists of only about ten
or twelve acres outside of prison walls. Alcatraz was called the
"Rock" and escape was generally considered to be impossible.
Also, the appellant in Giles was on a work detail under the supervision of prison guards and was in actual physical custody. It is
difficult to visualize how any conception of constructive custody
16. 22 Fed. Cas. 1210 (No. 13350) (C.C. RIL 1822).
17. 13 F.2d 269 (N.D. Ill.
1925).
18. 157 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1946).
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might enter the case. Despite this fact, one judge felt that even
in this situation sufficient physical custody had not been shown.
Judge Denman in his dissenting opinion 9 stated that there was
no evidence presented to show that anyone remained as a physical custodian of the prisoner and that an interpretation of the
statute to mean something other than physical custody would be
absurd.
The second case relied upon to support the court's argument
for constructive custody was United States v. Piscitello.20 Here,
the defendant who was a narcotics addict was sentenced to the
Federal Public Health Service Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky,
where he was released under guard to attend the funeral of his
mother in New York City. In the Pennsylvania station he
escaped from the two guards who were returning him to the
hospital. The Second Circuit held that the defendant was a
federal prisoner at an institution properly designated by the
Attorney General for his confinement and that the public health
service guards from whom the prisoner escaped were "representatives of the Attorney General" within the provisions of the
Federal Escape Act. Obviously, this case involves no constructive custody.
The third case cited by the majority in Frazierwas Tucker v.
United States2 1 where the defendant was removed from Alcatraz
to the Los Angeles County Jail in order that he might testify at
a criminal proceeding. This transfer was arranged under a government contract between the Bureau of Prisons and the county
jail. The contract also provided that the local sheriff was to keep
the prisoner in custody. When the prisoner became ill the jail
doctor directed that the defendant be removed to the Los Angeles
County General Hospital for emergency treatment. A deputy
sheriff took him to the jail unit of the hospital which was by
statute a part of the Los Angeles County Jail. In order to take
x-rays, the prisoner was removed to another portion of the hospital not within the jail unit. An orderly took the handcuffed
prisoner on a stretcher into an elevator and down to a lower
floor. As he was being pushed down a corridor, the prisoner
jumped from the stretcher and ran out of the hospital.
On an appeal from a conviction for escape, the prisoner contended that he was not in custody because he was not in the jail
19. Id. at 590 (dissenting opinion).
20. 231 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1956).
21. 251 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1958).
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unit, was not accompanied by a deputy sheriff and the orderly
was not an authorized representative of the Attorney General.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and held that after being removed
from Alcatraz to the county jail by a United States Marshal,
from the county jail to the jail unit of the hospital by a deputy
sheriff, and from the jail unit to another portion of the hospital
by an orderly, the prisoner was still in the custody of the United
States Attorney General.
In these three cases the various courts took the trouble to set
out myriad facts pointing to the control which was being exercised over the person of the prisoner. It would seem that facts
relating to physical custody would not be important if the court
did not still feel that some degree of physical custody was necessary to a conviction under the Escape Act.
A case which might be argued as support for such a theory
of custody as was advanced in Frazier is Johnson v. United
States.22 Here, a prisoner who escaped from the honor farm of
the United States Penetentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, claimed
that because of the nature of the farm he did not escape from
"custody". The court, conceding that he was accorded wide freedom and that security measures were minimal, characterized this
defense as frivolous. It appears that the court was not concerned
with the lack of physical custody.
United States 'v. Person" was a definite rejection of the doctrine of constructive custody. There, after being sentenced to the
custody of the Attorney General, the defendant was committed
to the Federal Correctional Institute at Lompoc, California. He
was later transferred from Lompoc to the Federal Pre-Release
Guidance Center where he was allowed to go to an outside job
but was required to return at night. When he was given a five
hour night pass so that he could visit his grandmother, he did
not return. The district court in this case went back to the basic
definition of custody as being purely physical and decided that
the prisoner was not in "custody" within the meaning of the
Federal Escape Act and therefore was not guilty of violating
this statute. They stated that the comments on custody in Johnson were characterized as being the purest kind of dictum, and
the court did not perceive Giles as supporting any theory of constructive custody. They also felt that Tucker, which involved a
man being wheeled along on a stretcher by an orderly of a hos22. 313 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963).

23. 223 F. Supp. 982 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
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pital and who was wearing a white gown and handcuffs, could
not be compared to the case of a prisoner who is allowed to go
about physically unfettered, dressed like any other man.
C. The Result of the New Doctrine
Recent cases generally have attempted to extend the common
conception of physical custody, but to what avail? Judge
Fahy in his dissenting opinion in Frazierpoints out that if there
were such a thing as constructive custody, then the prisoner
would have escaped from such custody only if his original commitment for the term of his imprisonment had the effect of continuing the custody of the Attorney General regardless of any
supervening transfer of physical custody. If this be the case, then
the resulting constructive custody of the Attorney General would
remain even after the prisoner's escape from Saint Elizabeths.
He would only be able to escape confinement and could never
escape constructive custody because it would follow him wherever he went.
In Nace v. United State824 the defendant was sent to the Federal Pre-Release Guidance Center at Los Angeles, where he was
permitted to go out on a job with a private employer as a part
of the Guidance Center program. Following one of these trips, he
did not return to the Guidance Center. His contention was that
because of the freedom which was allowed him and the minimal
security measures over him, he was not in such custody as could
make his failure to return an escape. The Eighth Circuit dismissed this contention as frivolous and said that whatever privileges the prisoner enjoyed, he was, nevertheless, under the legal
restraint of his sentence. The lower court 25 had said that the
appellant was committed to the custody of the officer in charge
of the center and that the officer had not abandoned him. If the
officer had not abandoned him and this constructive custody
remained after the prisoner left the guidance center, how could
he escape that constructive custody which followed him and was
seemingly with him at all times for the duration of his sentence?
Judge Denman, dissenting in Giles,26 comprehended the gov-

ernment's argument to be that the right of the Attorney General
to have custody means that the prisoner is in his custody any24. 334 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1964).
25. Nace v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 528 (D. Minn. 1964).

26. Giles v. United States, 157 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir. 1946) (dissenting

opinion). See text accompanying notes 18 and 19 supra.
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where in the area of the Attorney General's authority, which
would be the entire United States. The Government expressed
its view that it is not necessary to escape from the actual physical
custody of the Attorney General or one of his authorized representatives, and the prisoner is in the custody of the Attorney
General even though there is no physical custody whatsoever.
Denman stated that if this were true, the crime of escape from
custody could never be committed in the United States, for no
matter where the felon is or what he does, he is still in custody.
D. Conclusion,
The sole purpose of the Federal Escape Act is to provide punishment for the crime of escape. It is an elastic act and contains
several provisions under which an indictment can be brought. A
prosecutor could bring an indictment charging that the prisoner
escaped or attempted to escape from an institution in which he
had been confined by direction of the Attorney General. 27 An
indictment might also be brought charging that the prisoner
escaped or attempted to escape from custody under or by virtue
of any process issued under the laws of the United States by any
court, judge or commissioner.28 Judge Chambers, concurring in
Tucker v. United States,2 9 thought the latter alternative would
have been a better basis for the indictment, rather than the one
used. It was his belief that the majority opinion implied that
"custody of the Attorney General" is a necessary prerequisite to
a violation, and his purpose in writing a separate opinion was to
quash any thoughts that the indictment form which was used
in this case is always required.
Why is it that prosecutors with these numerous provisions
before them choose to bring an indictment charging that the
prisoner was in the custody of the Attorney General? In some
cases such custody is difficult to prove while there are other
provisions in the escape statute which are more fitting to the
particular case before the court. Rutledge v. United States 0
recognized the established rule that criminal statutes must be
construed strictly and favorably to liberty of citizens and ap27. See Strickland v. United States, 339 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1965) ; United
States v. Kinsman, 195 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
28. See, e.g., Payne v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 404 (M.D. Pa. 1949).
29. 251 F.2d 794, 800 (9th Cir. 1958) (concurring opinion). See text accompanying note 21 supra.
30. 146 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1944).
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plied it to the Federal Escape Act. The courts in expanding the
definition of custody have not followed this maxim. Custody
means and has always meant physical custody. The courts, in
trying to administer the law by punishing the offender, have
been forced by prosecutors who bring indictments charging
"custody of the Attorney General" to create the legal fiction of
constructive custody. This has developed to such an extent that
it precludes an escape from being an escape at all. The startling
thing about this problem is the simplicity of the solution. The
dispute in Fraziercould have been avoided and the case disposed
of with much less difficulty if the prosecutor had charged in the
indictment that the prisoner escaped from an institution in
which he was confined by direction of the Attorney General.
Rather than the courts trying to follow the prosecutors and
enforce their indictments by distorting the theory of the crime
of "escape" and the meaning of the word "custody", they might
simply return to the proper meaning of the word, and no doubt,
after a few cases have again established that physical custody is
required, prosecutors will take more care in the framing of their
indictments.
LARx J. RITOcH
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LABOR LAW-PLANT CLOSURE-INHERENT AND
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
UNDER SECTION 8(a) (3)*
Founded in 1883, the now defunct Darlington Manufacturing
Company operated a print cotton mill in Darlington, South
Carolina. In March, 1956, the Textile Workers Union of America
began a campaign to organize Darlington's employees. Following a union election victory,' Darlington closed its doors and disposed of its machinery and equipment at auction. The union then
filed unfair-labor practice charges with the National Labor Re-

lations Board charging that, by closing its plant, Darlington
had violated section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act. 2 The union further charged that Darlington was one of a
3
chain of mills controlled by Deering, Milliken & Company;
that Deering Milliken occupied a "single employer" status to
the employees of Darlington and the related corporations; and
that, as such, Deering Milliken was liable for the alleged unfair
labor practices of Darlington.
* Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co. (Sup. Ct. 1965).
1. Of the 523 eligible voters, 256 voted for the union and 248 against. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 270 (1962).
2. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . .. by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization...
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958). The union further charged that Darlington

violated § 8(a) (1) by coercing their employees in the exercise of their protected rights and § 8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain with the union after the
election. For a general discussion of business changes and their effect on § 8(a)
(5) duty to bargain see Maddux, Labor Law Problems Arising From Changes
in Business Operations, 20 Bus. LAw. 573 (1965); Burnstein, Subcontracting
and Plant Removals, 13 LAB. L.J. 405 (1962); Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1100,
1103 (1964); Note, 37 Nom DAM, LAw. 357 (1962).
3. When Darlington liquidated in 1956, it had outstanding 150,000 shares of
common stock, owned as follows:
Deering, Milliken & Co.
41A%
Cotwool Manufacturing Corp. (of which members of
the "Milliken family" owned a majority of shares) 18.3%
Individuals of the "Milliken Family"
6A%
Directors and employees of Deering, Milliken & Co.2.9%
Others (more than 200 scattered over
the United States)
31.0%
Total
100.0%
Brief for Respondent, p. 3, Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 85 Sup.
Ct 994 (1965).
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Darlington maintained that its closure was prompted by economic considerations 4 and that, at all events, it had the absolute
right to go out of business regardless of the reason. It listed
eight factors that influenced its decision to liquidate, six of
which, according to the Board, fit the traditional concept of
"economic" considerations; the two remaining factors pertained
to the economic impact of the union election on the profitable
operations of the mill.5 The Board rejected Darlington's contention that its right to go out of business was absolute 6 and held
that, but for the organizational activities of its employees, the
decision to close would not have been made. The Board further
held that the union election victory was not such an economic
7
factor as was contemplated by the act.

4. Aside from those factors which had rendered Darlington Mill a marginal
operation for a number of years, three "new" factors were cited:
(1) a projected loss of 6 cents per pound on products which it manufactured
in 1956 if they were carried into 1957 with the same costs and the same prices;
(2) a wage increase granted at other mills and the loss that would result
should it be granted at Darlington; and
(3) the increase in textile imports from Japan.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 273-74 (1962).
5. The union campaigned primarily on its promise to the workers that it
would prevent Darlington from carrying out the work assignments and
procedures that the company believed necessary to reduce costs to the point
where the plant could continue in business.
Brief for Respondent, p. 6, Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 85 Sup.
Ct. 994 (1965).
6. Darlington argued that, by shutting the mill, it had ceased to be an
employer within the meaning of the Act. Conceding that the Act did not define
specifically the characteristics of an "employer," the Board found, however,
that the discharged employees remained "employees within the meaning of the
Act" and reasoned, apparently, that for every "employee" there must be an
"employer."
Darlington's discharged workers remained employees within the statutory
definition, and their employment relationship vis-a-vis their employer did
not terminate.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 248 (1962), citing Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 190-91 (1941). Phelps Dodge, however, though it was
concerned with discharged employees, did not involve an employer who had
gone out of business.
7. When an employer discharges its employees for selecting a union to
represent them, the motivation is not "economic" in the sense contemplated
by the Act-notwithstanding the employer's belief that it could not afford
to pay increased wages that the union representative might demand. The
overall effect of Darlington's listing of the eight so-called "economic"
factors is an admission that the employees' union activities were, in part,
the cause of its decision to close the mill.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 245 (1962), citing Industrial Fabricating, 119 N.L.R.B. 162 (1957). (Emphasis added.) The Board adopted the
trial examiner's findings that Darlington had violated § 8(a) (1) of the Act by:
(a) interrogation of employees with respect to their activities on behalf of
the union;
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Moreover, even assuming, as the Respondent contends, that
six genuine economic factors as well as the employees' union
activities were responsible for the closing of the mill, Darlington's action was no less unlawful. A plant shutdown
resulting in the discharge of employees that is partly due
to employees' union activities constitutes an unfair labor
practice.8
The Board found sufficient common ownership, common control
over labor relations,9 and common control over operations among
Deering Milliken and its related corporations, including Darlington, to constitute a single employer 0 responsible for unfair labor
practices and ordered Darlington to provide back pay to its dis(b) statements made before the election that Darlington would close the
plant if the employees selected the union as their bargaining agent;
(c) statements made connecting the decision to close the plant with the
employees activities on behalf of the union; and
(d) encouraging the employees to sign the petition disavowing the union
that circulated after the election.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 244-45 (1962). The trial examiner also
found, and the Board adopted such findings, that Darlington had violated
§ 8(a) (5) by anticipating the workers union demands and terminating its
operations to avoid bargaining over such demands. Id. at 252-53.
8. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 246 (1962), citing NLRB v.
Jamestown Sterling Corp., 211 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1954) and NLRB v. Whitin
Mach. Works, 204 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1953). Neither of these cases involves an
attempted economic justification for a plant closure. In Jamestown Sterling, the
court held that the National Labor Relations Act was violated when an employee was discharged partly for neglect of duty and partly for his union
activities. Whitin Mach. Works held that a discharge was unlawful only when
motivated more by an employee's union activities than his poor performance.
9. Centralized control over labor relations is a factor frequently stressed
by the Board in finding common control of separate entities. See, e.g., Dearborn
Oil & Gas Corp., 125 N.L.R.B. 645 (1959); Editorial "El Imparcial," Inc.,
123 N.L.R.B. 1585, 1593 (1959), enf'd 278 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1960); Thomas
Morelli, 123 N.L.R.B. 635 (1959); Combined Century Theatres, Inc., 120
N.L.R.B. 1379, 1380-81 (1958); Aconsti Eng'r, Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 1415, 1416
(1955) ; National Electronic Mfg. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 620 (1955). It appears,
however, that common control of labor relations alone is not sufficient.
We believe that it is proper to require that both elements-common ownership and common control-coexist before we assess joint liability.
Dearborn Oil & Gas Corp., 125 N.L.R.B. 645, 647 (1959). Common ownership
without common control over labor relations apparently is also insufficient.
Knight Newspapers, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1346 (1962).
10. (1) Common ozizership. The Board noted that the "Milliken family"
owned, either directly or individually through Deering, Milliken & Co. and Cotwool Manufacturing Corp., 66o of Darlington and from 889o to 55% of all the
affiliated corporations. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 256 (1962).
(2) Common control over labor relations. In this "crucial area," the Board
found that Roger Milliken, as president of all but one of the corporations, exercised ultimate control over the labor relations of all the corporations and that
the major decisions were exclusively in his hands. Id. at 256-57.
(3) Control over operations.The board stressed the integrated administration
of tax and accounting procedures, insurance and financial reports, plus partici-
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charged employees until they should obtain substantially equivalent employment elsewhere." However, Darlington might reduce
its back pay liability by an affirmative showing that on a particular date it would have ceased operations or laid off a portion
of its labor force even had the union not won representation.'Sitting en banc, the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth
Circuit, by a divided vote and with a strong dissent, denied enforcement of the order. 13 Even assuming that unionization was
responsible for the closure, the court held that an actual, unfeigned, and permanent discontinuance, either of all or only part
of an employer's operations, 14 is his absolute prerogative. The
majority maintained that the fundamental purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to protect the rights of both labor
and industry only so long as an employer-employee relationship
exists; that it compelled no one to become or remain an employer
or an employee; and that either might lawfully withdraw from
that status, so long as the obligations of any employment contract have been met.' 5
pation in details of operations of the related corporations by other officers of
Deering Milliken. Id. at 257.
Members Leedom and Rogers dissented as to the finding of a "single employer." Member Leedom found no "common ownership" within the meaning of
the decided cases, since, while members of the "Milliken family" owned stock
in all the corporations involved, all such members did not own stock in each
of the corporations. Id. at 262 (dissenting opinion).
Member Rogers argued that the mere potentiality of common control and
integrated operations, absent an affirmative showing of the exercise of such
potential, is not sufficient grounds to support a finding of a single employer.
Id. at 263 (dissenting opinion). See Knight Newspapers, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B.

1346 (1962).

11. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197-200 (1941). Deductions
must be made, not only of the actual earnings of employees during the period,
but also of any amounts which the employees failed without excuse to earn.
12. In any event the Trial Examiner's finding that the record establishes that
Darlington's mill would not have closed but for the employee's union activities gives rise to the presumption that Darlington would have continued
to operate the mill absent that union activity.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 254 n.38 (1962).
13. Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963) (Chief
Judge Sobeloff and Judge Bell dissenting).
14. Even assuming that Darlington was found to he a division of Deering
Milliken under the single employer concept, the court held that a part of a
business could be abolished with impunity when the dissolution was entire, bona
fide, and irrevocable. Id. at 687.
15. If a cessation of business is adopted to avoid labor relations, the proprietor
pays the price of it: permanent dissolution of his business, in whole or in
part. A statute authorizing an order forcing the continued pursuit of operations in these circumstances would be of doubtful validity.
Id. at 685. The dissenters argued that the plant closure violated the basic policies embodied in the National Labor Relations Act as well as the literal language of § 8(a) (3). They concurred in the reasoning of the Board that the
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On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, the decision of the

court of appeals was vacated and the case remanded for further
proceedings. 16 The court upheld an employer's absolute right
to terminate his entire business' 7 but held that a partial liquidation' s is an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a) (3)
if motivated by an intent to chill unionism in any of the remaining plants and if the employer might reasonably have foreseen
that his closing would likely have that effect. A complete liquidation yields no future benefit to the employer, but a discriminatory partial closing may afford leverage, as in the case of a
"runaway shop" or a temporary closing, for discouraging the
free exercise of protected rights among the remaining employees.
The closing of a plant immediately following a union election
victory is not, however, absent an inquiry into the employer's
motives, inherently discriminatory.
A. The Discouragement Factor
Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act provides
that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employee ... by

discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
economic and financial effects of unionization on the future profitable opera-

tions of the business were not such factors as the employer might lawfully consider in his decision to liquidate.

A belief that union wage demands and bargaining attitudes towards work
loads may make future operations unprofitable does not constitute an economic reason which would excuse the petitioner's conduct in this case.
Id. at 691. The dissenters also found sufficient evidence to support the Board's
conclusion that Darlington and Deering Milliken constituted a "single employer."
16. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 994 (1965) (Justices Stewart and Goldberg not participating).
17. A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation that it
should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative
intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor Act. We
find neither.
Id. at 999.
18. In setting the applicable standards for the finding of a "single employer"
for purposes of establishing an 8(a) (3) violation, the Court stressed that
organizational integration of plants ana corporations was not necessary. The
persons exercising control over a plant being closed for anti-union reasons
must (1) have an interest in another business sufficient to give promise of their
benefitting from the discouragement of unionization in that business; (2) close
their plant in order to produce that result; and (3) occupy a relationship to
the other business which makes it reasonably foreseeable that its employees will
fear that that business will also be closed if they participate in organizational
activities. Id. at 1002.
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any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ....19
As all employer acts resulting in the discharge of any or all of
his employees affect their tenure of employment, the issue in all
8(a) (3) cases is whether the action complained of encouraged
or discouraged membership in a labor organization and, if so,
whether such encouragement or discouragement was accomplished through discrimination.
It has been said that discouragement is a "subtle thing" requiring "a high degree of introspective perception."2 0 Whether or
not this is true, the courts have not required proof of actual discouragement; rather, they have spoken in terms of a tendency
to discourage, basing violations on the foreseeable effect 2 ' of
the employer's actions rather than actual discouragement in
fact. 22 The Supreme Court has concurred with this reasoning,
stating that the employees discriminated against need not be the
ones discouraged and that the change in the employees' desire to
join a union need not have immediate manifestations. 2 But any
stand taken by an employer which effectively blocks a union
demand tends in some way to discourage support of the union,
and it is not discouragement alone or discrimination alone which
24
is prohibited-only a combination of the two.

19. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley

Act), 29 U.S.C.

§158(a) (3) (1958).
20. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 51 (1954).

21. Mr. Justice Harlan in Darlington states that an unfair labor practice is
made out if the employer had the requisite intent of "chilling" unionism and if
he "may reasonably have foreseen that such closing will likely have that effect."
Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 994, 1002 (1965).
22. See, e.g., Summit Mining Corp. v.NLRB, 260 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir.
1958) ; NLRB v. J. I. Case Co., 198 F.2d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 1952) ; 65 CoLum.
L. REv. 537, 538 (1965).
* . . no statistical proof of an actual 'encouraging'
[or discouraging] effect
on union membership need be shown where the discriminatory conduct by
its nature 'tends to encourage or discourage' union membership.
NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 197 F.2d 719, 722 (2d Cir. 1952), afj'd Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). However, one commentator
appears to favor the requirement of proof that membership in a labor organization was in fact discouraged.
.. it would be absurd to suppose that section [8(a) (5)] makes it an
unfair labor practice unsuccessfully to attempt to refuse to bargain collectively. So it is with section [8(a) (3)].
Ward, "Discrimination" under the National Labor Relations Act, 48 YAix L.J.
1152, 1165-66 (1939).
23. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 51 (1954).
24. Thus this section does not outlaw all encouragement or discouragement of
membership in labor organizations; only such as is accomplished by discrimination is prohibited.
Id. at 42-43.
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B. Inherent Discmination
Basically, acts of discrimination are of two types. One type
involves differentiation or unequal treatment among members
of a group. The second involves a change in treatment of the
group as a whole. The latter is discriminatory in its effect, while
in the former the discrimination is inherent in the act itself.
However, discrimination is, by nature, an imprecise term.25 In
its broadest sense, as used above, it encompasses all differentiation in treatment 26 and is involved in all employer acts in departing from the status quo. Yet in its more colloquial sense it has
a connotation of prejudice or hostility and injurious intent. Consequently, for discrimination to constitute a violation of section
8(a) (3), it generally must be shown not only that the act of
the employer discouraged union membership but also that he
27
intended to effect that result.

The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that certain
employer conduct so inherently discourages union membership
that it is violative of the statute regardless of motive.28 Moreover, not only is specific evidence of intent unnecessary in such
cases, but proof of a legitimate business purpose will not necessarily preclude the establishment of a violation of 8(a) (3).20
Such conduct is saved only by an overriding business purpose
that is sufficiently significant to justify the deterrent effect on
25. Judge Medina of the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit has
observed in a recent case what he terms the "natural tendency of human beings

to attribute their lack of success to discrimination of one kind or another against
them." See NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 1963).
26. Thus two elements seem to be of essence--differentiation and affirmative
action in the making thereof.
Ward, "Discriminatiotn" under the National Labor Relations Act, 48 YAiE L.J.
1152, 1170 (1939).
27. We have heretofore observed that employer action which has a foreseeable consequence of discouraging concerted activities generally does not
amount to a violation of § 8(a) (3) in the absence of a showing of motivation which is aimed at achieving the prohibited effect.
Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 994, 1003 (1965).
28. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Radio Officers'
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). In Erie Resistor, the Court held that it
was an unfair labor practice regardless of motive for an employer to grant a
twenty year seniority credit to strike breakers. But see Mr. Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion. Id. at 237. In Radio Officers', the Court held that a legitimate motive did not save the employer's conduct of granting preferential wages
to union members over non-union members. See also Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961), holding that an agreement by which
an employer hired only those prospective employees referred through a union
hiring hall was not "inherently discriminatory." See generally, 48 VA. L. REv.
128 (1962).
29. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963).
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employee rights.80 The motivation factor in this type of discrimination is based on the common law concept of foreseeabilitythat the employer is held to intend the very consequences which
foreseeably and inescapably flow from his actions. 31 Yet foreseeability of discouragement alone is not a sufficient basis to
establish a violation ;32 the conduct itself must be so patently
destructive of the employees' organizational rights as to be "inherently discriminatory."
Although the specific acts of the employer that would fit this
test remain in doubt, two recent Supreme Court cases have clarified somewhat the inherent discrimination concept. In American
,ShipBuilding Co. v. NLRB 33 and NLRB v. Brown,34 a minority
of the Supreme Court were of the opinion that, in cases where
an intent to discourage is absent, the correct test for determining
a violation is the balancing of conflicting legitimate interests3 5 whether the business justification for the employer's action outweighs the discouragement of employees' organizational rights.
This concept of inherent discrimination would then apply to all
cases where a significant anti-union effect is foreseeable and
where the Board determines as a matter of policy that the preponderant interests in conflict favor the union.
A majority of the Court, while not completely rejecting this
balancing test, would require more than a mere imbalance of
interests between the employer and the union. The employer's
conduct must be inherently and demonstrably destructive of
employee rights and completely devoid of significant economic
30. Id. at 231. See Mr. Justice Harlan's Concurring opinion. Id. at 237. Coinpare Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 232 F.2d 158, 161 (4th Cir. 1956)
with NLRB v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 189 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1951). See also
NLRB v. American Aggregate Co., 305 F2d 559 (5th Cir. 1962); 39 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 617 (1964); 4 BOSTON COLLEGE INDUS. AND CommEaciAL

L. Rv.

438 (1963).

31. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954); NLRB v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 321 F.2d 733, 737 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Summit Mining
Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir. 1958).
It is a well recognized rule in labor relations law that 'a man is held to
intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduce.
NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., 339 F.2d 203, 204-05 (6th Cir. 1964).
32. NLRB v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1965);
NLRB v. Community Shops, Inc., 301 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1962). See concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB,

365 U.S. 667, 677-85 (1961).

33. 85 Sup. Ct. 955 (1965).
34. 85 Sup. Ct. 980 (1965).
35. Citing NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
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justification.3" Therefore, although under the circumstances
the effect of the employer's conduct is so prejudicial to the
employees' organizational rights as to outweigh the employer's
interests, the showing of a legitimate interest by the employer
that is in fact significant will preclude a finding of inherent
discrimination.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth
and Ninth Circuits have limited this inherent discrimination
concept to cases where the employer has discriminated among
his employees, as opposed to discrimination against the group
as a whole, and further only to cases where the sole criteria for
31

such differential treatment was union membership or aetivity.

Accordingly, when the employer's action is directed at the
employees as a whole, as in the closing of an entire plant, or
against a part of the group that is defined by other than union
membership or activity and includes non-unionists or non-activists, the conduct is lawful absent an intent to discourage union
membership. 38 This rule is applied notwithstanding the fact that
union activity may have been the direct cause of the business
condition upon which an employer bases his decision. However,
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Ee Re36. The Court in American Shipbuilding held that an employer does not violate section 8(a) (3) when, after a bargaining impasse has been reached, he
temporarily shuts down his plant and lays off his employees to bring economic
pressure to bear on the union. In Brown the Court held that the non-struck
members of a multi-employer bargaining unit did not violate the act when they
locked out their employees and used temporary replacements in response to a
"whipsaw" strike against one member of the group who also continued his
business operations.
37. NLRB v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1965);
Quality Castings Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 36, 41 (6th Cir. 1963); PittsburghDes Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74, 82 (9th Cir. 1960).
Despite this broad language the Court clearly chose to limit the Board's
ability to infer unlawful intent from a showing of discrimination and the
foreseeable results thereof to those situations where the discrimination is
based solely upon union membership or union activity.
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74, 82 (9th Cir. 1960).
Cf. NLRB v. Local 50, Am. Bakery Workers, 339 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1964);
NLRB v. Richards, 265 F.2d 855 (3d Cir. 1959). But see NLRB v. Electric
Steam Radiator Corp., 321 F.2d 733, 737 (6th Cir. 1963) (semble). Here, the
employer omitted paying his customary Christmas bonus because his employees
had voted for the union allegedly for legitimate reasons, an action which fits
squarely into the category of discrimination against, rather than discrimination
anong, his employees. However, it is not clear whether this decision is based
on a finding of inherent discrimination as well as an acceptance of the Board's
finding of improper motivation or upon improper motivation alone. In either
event, this case casts serious doubt on this proposition as it applies to the Sixth
Circuit in cases where an employer has a mistaken belief that he has a legitimate reason for his actions. Cf. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 85 Sup. Ct.
171 (1964).
38. Quality Castings Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 36, 41 (6th Cir. 1962).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1964

33

586

[Vol.
VIEW
A LAW
SouthSouTH
CarolinaCAROLiN
Law Review,
Vol.R17,
Iss. 4 [1964], Art.
9 17

sistor Corp.,39 it is apparent that, if the concept of inherent discrimination is to be so limited, it must include not only those
cases where the criteria for differential treatment is expressed
solely in terms of union membership or activity but also those
where the effect of the action is so limited. 40
Although the Supreme Court has studiously avoided delineating strict guidelines for the application of this principle, it appears likely that the disparate treatment of union and non-union
members or activists is the inherently prejudicial conduct they
contemplated, and that their failure to specifically limit its
application by a less viable standard is merely an allowance for
an anticipated penumbra. Moreover, whatever the eventual extent of its application, it appears that the requirement of foreseeability of discouragement and lack of significant economic
justification limit rather than delineate the scope of this concept.
The correct formula appears to be, not that foreseeability plus
lack of economic justification equals inherently discouraging
conduct, but that conduct which is patently destructive of employee rights in and of itself is inherently discriminatory only
when these two additional factors are also present. In all events,
it is evident from Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion in DarZington
that a plant closure, affecting union and non-union members
alike, is not inherently discriminatory despite its immediately
41
following the election of a union.
C. IntentionaZ Discrimination
In cases where the employer's conduct is not inherently discriminatory, the act is an unfair labor practice only if the motive
is found to be unlawful--"both discrimination and a resulting
discouragement of union membership are necessary, but the
added element of unlawful intent is also required." 42 Although
this principle appears never to have been in doubt,43 it is per39. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
40. In Erie Resistor the criteria used for differential treatment was not ex-

pressed in terms of union membership or activity but in terms of those employees and strike replacements who were available for work. However, by
granting superseniority to this group, the effect of this action was felt solely
by a group defined in terms of union activity-those employees who continued
to strike.
41. It is also clear that the ambiguous act of closing a plant following the
election of a union is not, absent an inquiry into the employer's motive,
inherently discriminatory.
Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 994, 999 n.10 (1965).
42. NLRB v. Brown, 85 Sup. Ct. 980, 985 (1965).
43. But see Judge Friendly's dissent in NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d
172, 180 (2d Cir. 1963).
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verted to a great extent by the Board's conclusion that section
8(a) (3) prohibits discrimination because of union activity.44
This obvious shortcut

45

fails to distinguish between objective

cause and subjective intent and fails to recognize the possibility
and often the actuality that, while union activity may have
caused the condition on which the employer acts, he does not
intend thereby to discourage union membership. The correct
rule, it appears, is not that a violation is made out merely by
proving a causal connection between the union activity and the
employer's act, but that the employer must actually intend to
discourage union membership. 46 Therefore, absent an actual
intent to discourage, an employer may discharge his employees
47
or close his plant for the good reason, bad reason, or no reason.
And although a charge of unlawful motivation is generally
countered by a showing of economic justification, the prevailing
attitude among the courts of appeals is as is clearly expressed in
44. See Ward, "Discrimnination" under the National Labor Relations Act,

48 YALE L.J. 1152, 1154-56 (1939).

45. Judge Medina's comment seems applicable:

like all clich6s and short cuts in the law, designed to make life easy for
the judicial officer who has to make decisions, this merely eliminates the
thinking process necessary to get at the root of the matter.
NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 1963).
46. An unfair labor practice has been committed only if the discrimination
was deliberately designed to encourage [or discourage] membership in the
union.
NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 180 (2d Cir. 1963).
In order to find a section 8(a) (3) violation it is necessary to either prove
or infer (1) that the employer discriminated as to 'hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment,' (2) that this discrimination encouraged or discouraged membership in any labor organization,
and (3) that this was done intentionally.
NLRB v. W. L. Rives Co., 328 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1964). (Emphasis
added.)
Thus, even though a natural foreseeable consequence of employer discrimination might be the discouragement of union activity, such discrimination
is not unlawful unless actuated by an intent to achieve the foreseeable
consequence rather than by a desire to carry out a legitimate business
function.
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74, 83 (9th Cir. 1960).
47. [A]n employer has the right to discharge an employee for good reason,
bad reason or no reason, absent discrimination.
Steel Industries v. NLRB, 325 F2d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1963).
Certainly, an employer may hire and discharge at will so long as his action
is not based on opposition to union activities.
NLRB v. South Rambler Co., 324 F2d 447, 449 (8th Cir. 1963).
[But] no employer has yet appeared hardy enough--or foolhardy enoughto rest on the 'sheer caprice' defense. ..
Ward, "Discriminatior"under the National Labor Relations Act, 48 YAM. L.J.
1152, 1170 (1939).
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NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, Inc.4" and NLRB v. Dalton Brick &
4
Tile Oorp. 0
We are not saying that the economic reasons offered by an
employer must meet the approval of a governmental agency
before he may go out of business, or even that the economic
justification must be economically sound. Rather, we are
merely saying that these economic considerations must be
honestly invoked, and that an employer may not attempt to
disguise an anti-union motive by speaking the language of
economic necessity."0
Nor is the so-called employer justification limited to those
factors which might be described as economic hardship. 51
The question then becomes, not whether the asserted economic
reasons for a discontinuance or other business change are objectively sound, but whether the employer has acted on the sincere
exercise of his business judgement. 52 The question is not one of
justification but one of motivation. Proof of economic justifica48. 327 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1964).
49. 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
A businessman retains the untrammeled prerogative to close his enterprise
when in the exercise of a legitimate and justified business judgement he
concludes that such a step is either economically desirable or economically
necessary.
NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696, 700 (1st Cir. 1962).
50. NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, Inc., 327 F.2d 370, 372 (2d Cir. 1964).
51. NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886, 894 (5th Cir. 1962).
52. NLRB v. Kelly & Picerne, Inc., 298 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1962) (dictum).
It is not the wisdom of the business acumen reflected by the change, which
is determinative of whether there is a violation. It is the predominant motive behind the change.
NLRB v. Kingsford, 313 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir. 1963).
A good faith belief, even if it turns out in fact to be incorrect, can be
sufficient to refute a charge of unlawful discharge.
Cedar Rapids Block Co. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 1964).
But it is not for the Board to determine whether or not an employer's
business judgement was too harsh under the circumstances. Rather the
burden is on the Board to show that an improper motive dictated the
employer's decision....
NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 725, 726 (1st Cir. 1964). Accord,
Snow v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1962); Action Wholesale, 145
N.L.R.B. 627, 635 (1963). But see NLRB v. Brown-Dunkin Co., 287 F.2d 17
(10th Cir. 1961), where the court of appeals appears to have based its enforcement of the Board's order on the fact that the employer's decision to subcontract was later found to increase rather than decrease the cost of operations.
In NLRB v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 130 F.2d 624 (9th
Cir. 1942), the court of appeals rejected the employer's contention that its
department was discontinued solely in the interest because the discontinuance
was not made in response to any immediate change in circumstances. However,
the decision appears to turn on a rejection of the alleged motive rather than
a requirement of a showing of new economic factors.
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tion is important only in so far as it might tend to prove or

disprove the actual motive; it does not allow the Board to substitute its business judgement for that of the employer.
The Board, however, has taken a contrary position. It has
apparently rejected the concept of discrimination through intent
and has consistently adhered to another theory of discrimination-differentiation without sufficient justification. Before the
Board, therefore, an employer must not only refute the charge
of unlawful intent but must also sustain the propriety of his
decision. Further, it appears that the only justification recognized by the Board for an employer who closes his plant without
first bargaining with the victorious union is absolute economic
necessity. 53
Notwithstanding this conflict between the Board and the
courts of appeals, both readily accept the proposition that the
existence of some justifiable grounds for affecting a business
change is no defense if it was not the moving cause.5" If an intent
to discourage union membership was the real motive, it is no
defense that at the same time there were justifiable grounds for
such action.55
D. Determination of Motive
The Board is the trier of facts, the drawer of inferences from
circumstantial and conflicting evidence, and the judge of the
proper weight of the evidence.5 6 A court of appeals is without
53. In Mayer B. Cohen, 142 N.L.R.B. 580, 586 (1963), the Board accepted
the trial examiner's determination that "there was no economic necessity demonstrated to justify the discontinuance." (Emphasis added.) In Ethel J. Hinz,
140 N.L.R.B. 232, 234 (1962), the Board noted that the employer had failed to
produce "proof indicating that there was an economic necessity for closing the
plant." (Emphasis added.) And in Brown Transp. Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 954,
957 (1963), the Board held that the employer's contention that he was unable
to pay the wage demands of the union was "supported only by speculation and
conjecture" and therefore that he had violated § 8(a) (3) by subcontracting.
Moreover, in Clodomiro Isolino, 142 N.L.R.B. 1299 (1963), enforcement denied
Oneonta Dress Co. v. NLRB, 333 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1964), the Board appears to
hold that the employer must produce "documentary evidence" to support his
claim of economic necessity.
54. E.g., NLRB v. Solo Cup Co., 237 F.2d 521, 524 (8th Cir. 1956); NLRB
v. Texas Independent Oil Co., 232 F.2d 447, 450 (9th Cir. 1956).
55. E.g., Wonder State Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 737, 738 (6th Cir. 1964).
56. See, e.g., NLRB v. Winona Knitting Mills, Inc., 163 F.2d 156, 160 (8th
Cir. 1947), citing International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 79
(1940) and NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 597-99 (1941). Inferences
to be drawn from evidence as to unfair labor practices is a function of the
Board and not the courts. NLRB v. Chicago Steel Foundry Co., 142 F.2d 306,
308 (7th Cir. 1944), citing NLRB v. Nevada Consol. Copper Co., 316 U.S. 105
(1942).
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authority to substitute its own judgement for that of the Board
and must uphold the Board's findings whenever they are supported by substantial evidence.5 7 The court may not displace the
Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views of the evidence, even though the court would have justifiably made a
different determination had the matter been before it de novo. 58
However, the reviewing court must consider the record as a
whole, taking into account not only the evidence which supports
the Board's conclusion but also that which fairly detracts from
its weight. It is not barred from setting aside a Board decision
when it cannot conscientiously find that substantial evidence
supports that decision when viewed in the light of the record in

its entirety." It is not sufficient for the Board to draw inferences from circumstances out of context,10 nor does it sustain its

burden of proof merely by discounting all the explanations offered by an employer without finding an unlawful motivation
through substantial direct or indirect evidence."'
Since the employer's motive is an intangible factor, direct
proof is usually impossible. Motivation, therefore, is generally
determined from inferences drawn from surrounding circum57. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404 (1962); Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-90 (1951) ; NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940).
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See NLRB v.
Southland Mfg. Co., 201 F.2d 244, 246-48 (4th Cir. 1952).
58. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
So long as the view which the Board embraced is supported by substantial
evidence

. .

., that determination will not be set aside.

NLRB v. United States Air Conditioning Corp., 302 F.2d 280, 283 (1st Cir.

1962).

[However] although the Board's expertise deserves respect, its conclusions
must have some evidential or rational inferential support before we can
endorse them.
NLRB v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 F.2d 690, 696 (2d Cir. 1965). See
NLRB v. Council Mfg. Corp., 334 F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1964); NLRB v.
Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 293 F.2d 300, 308-09 (5th Cir. 1961); NLRB
v. Brown-Dunkin Co., 287 F.2d 17, 19 (10th Cir. 1961).
59. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488-90 (1951). See,
e.g., NLRB v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 274 F.2d 381, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1960);
Annot., 95 L. Ed. 473 (1950).
60. Beaver Valley Canning Co. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 429, 432 (8th Cir. 1964).
Our duty to examine the record as a whole

. . .

was made impossible by

the Examiner's ignoring without explanation or analysis and seemingly
without consideration the evidence offered by the respondent.. . . Respondent's offer of a coherent and logical explanation for its conduct deserves a
less cavalier treatment.

NLRB v. Daniels Constr. Co., 332 F.2d 791, 792 (4th Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
61. Riggs Distler & Co. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 575, 580 (4th Cir. 1963).
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stances. But an unlawful motive is not lightly to be inferred.02
The burden is not on the employer to exonerate himself of unfair
labor practices, the burden is on the Board to prove the charges
by substantial evidence. 63 Among the factors considered most
important by the Board in making such a determination, and
by the courts of appeals in reviewing the Board's findings, are
4
a prior history of opposition or hostility towards unionism,
62. NLRB v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 274 F.2d 381, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1960).
63. Administrative Procedure Act § 7 (c), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1958). E.g.,
NLRB v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 293 F.2d 300, 309 n.15 (5th Cir.
1961) ; NLRB v. Goodyear Footwear Corp., 186 F.2d 913, 916 (7th Cir. 1951).
But it is not for the Board to determine whether or not an employer's
business judgement was too harsh under the circumstances. Rather the
burden is on the Board to show that an improper motive dictated the
employer's decision ...
NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 725, 726 (1st Cir. 1964). Compare
with Board case, Almeida Bus Lines, 140 N.L.R.B. 280 (1962). The Board
apparently requires that once a prima facie case has been established, that the
employer must go forward with the evidence by introducing documentary evidence of economic justification. Compare Clodomiro Isolino, 142 N.L.R.B. 1299
(1963) with Oneonta Dress Co. v. NLRB, 333 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1964) (denying
enforcement of same). Cf. Brown Transp. Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 954, 957 (1963),
where the Board held that the employer's attempted economic defense based
on his inability to pay the wage demands of the union was "supported only by
speculation and conjecture."
64. A general bias or general hostility and interference, whether proved or
conceded, does not supply the element of purpose. ... But anti-union bias
and demonstrated unlawful hostility are proper and highly significant
factors for Board evaluation in determining motive.
NLRB v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 274 F2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1960). Accord,
NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696, 701 (1st Cir. 1962);
NLRB v. Norma Mining Co., 206 F.2d 38, 42 (4th Cir. 1953). However, though
anti-union hostility may be significant in finding an illegal motive, it is not
conclusive. "[A]n employer's general hostility to unions, without more, does
not supply an unalwful motive as to a specific discharge." NLRB v. South
Rambler Co. v. NLRB, 324 F.2d 447, 449-50 (8th Cir. 1963). The courts have
generally recognized that anti-union hostility during the course of an organizational campaign is to be expected. See, e.g., Fort Smith Broadcasting Co. v.
NLRB, 341 F.2d 874, 879 (8th Cir. 1965). For that reason, more is required
than a mere showing of animosity, especially in cases where there is convincing
evidence that a business change is economically motivated. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Kingsford, 313 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Atlanta Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 293 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc.,
293 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1961). On the other hand, it appears that a lack of
demonstrated hostility or opposition towards unionism has been the controlling
factor in cases failing to find an illegal motive. See, e.g., NLRB v. Daniels
Constr. Co., 332 F2d 791 (4th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); NLRB v. R. C.
Mahon Co., 269 F.2d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 1959) ; NLRB v. Great Falls Employers'
Council, Inc., 277 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1960); Missoula Motel Ass'n, 148
N.L.R.B. No. 146 (1964); Anderson Box Co., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 77 (1964).
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threats and coercion of employees,6 5 and the timing of the employer's action. 6 All are significant, but none conclusive.
E. Cause versus Motivation: The Objective versus the Subjective
Measure of Discrimination
Although the NLRB apparently concluded that Darlington's
action was motivated by an intent to discourage union membership, the primary rationale of the Board case rests on the proposition that an 8(a) (3) violation is made out if there is a cause
and effect relationship between the employee's activity and the
65. A near coincidence of threats, coercion or interrogation of employees
with a layoff or plant closure has been regarded as highly significant. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Winchester Electronics, Inc., 295 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1961); NLRB
v. Hill & Hill Truck Line, Inc., 266 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Sifers,
171 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1948). However, at least one of the courts of appeals has
expressed some concern over what it considers to be the tendency of the Board
to give more weight to isolated employer statements than seems justified.
We have the impression that the Board of late has tended to overstretch
this type of issue and that

. . .

a foundation of much greater substance

is required than the isolated statement present here.
NLRB v. Council Mfg. Co., 334 F.2d 161, 165 (8th Cir. 1964).
66. While the near coincidence of a business change with union activity, without more, is not substantially indicative of an unlawful motive, the proximity
of the employees' activity and the employer's action renders an employer vulnerable and serves to make his motive an issue of fact. NLRB v. Council Mfg.
Corp., 334 F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1964). It appears, however, that more important than the timing of the employer's action is the manner in which it is
carried out. In cases involving individual or mass discharge, plant removals,
subcontracting, or shutdowns, the suddenness of the action and the summariness
of the discharge gives rise to some doubt as to the good faith of the assigned
reasons. See, e.g., NLRB v. Winchester Electronics, Inc., 295 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.
1961) (mass layoffs); NLRB v. Hill & Hill Truck Lines, Inc., 266 F.2d 883
(1st Cir. 1959) (mass layoffs); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 242 F.2d
497, 502 (2d Cir. 1957) (discharge of two employees); NLRB v. Somerset
Classics, Inc., 193 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1951) (temporary closure); NLRB v.
Sifers, 171 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1948) (temporary closure-plant closed without
the customary notification to employees); NLRB v. Bank of America Nat.
Trust & Say. Ass'n, 130 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1942) (abolition of a department).
See generally Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 535, 546-47 (1962). The fact that an employer had considered the change before the advent of the union activity tends
to support his assertion of good faith. See, e.g., NLRB v. Kingsford, 313 F.2d
826 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Jay Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961).
In such a case, it may appear that the union activity was instituted to combat
the employer's anticipated action rather than the employer's action being an
attempt to combat the union. See NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 211
F.2d 848, 853 (5th Cir. 1954). In cases where a decision has already been
reached by the employer, there is a split between the Board and the courts of
appeals as to whether the accelerated implementation of this decision because of
union activity constitutes a violation of § 8(a) (3). The Board has held that
it does. M. Swack Iron & Steel Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1964) ; Ethel J. Hinz
140 N.LR.B. 232 (1962). Two courts of appeals have explicitly held that it
does not. NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); Mount
Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954). This does not
mean, however, that an employer may accelerate the implementation of his
decision if he intends thereby to discourage membership in the union. Compare
Mount Hope with NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1962).
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employer's action.6 7 This rationale raises one major question
which strikes at the heart of section 8 (a) (3) :that is, is the controlling factor in 8(a) (3) discrimination the circumstances and
conditions upon which an employer bases his decision or his actual subjective intent ?68 More specifically, may an employer who
intends merely to make the most effective use of his capital consider the economic ramifications of unionization and act accordingly. 69 While at least six of the courts of appeals have answered
this question in the affirmative, 70 the Board has yet to concur.7 1
67. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 246-47 (1962). For other Board
cases applying this "but for" concept, see, e.g., Morrison Cafeterias Consol.,
Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 15 (1964); Star Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 678 (1963),
enforcement denied, NLRB v. Neiderman, 334 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Industrial Farbicating Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 170 (1957), enf'd per curiam, NLRB
v. Mackneish, 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959). See generally Rothman, The
"Right" to go out of Business, 6 BOSTON COLLEGE INDUS. & CoamERcAL L.
Rxv. 1, 3-5 (1964); 48 CORNELL L.Q. 572, 576-78 (1963).
68. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
61 HARV. L. REv. 1, 20-22 (1947).
69. One commentator has divided the possible employer motives into three
categories: (1) "independent economic motives"; (2) "economic anti-union
motives"; and (3) "non economic anti-union motives." By "economic anti-union
motives," he apparently means the consideration of the economic aspects of
unionization. See Note, 77 HAmv. L. REv. 1100, 1101 (1964). The Board refuses
to recognize the distinction between (2) and (3), calling it a "distinction without a difference." Morrison Cafeterias Consol., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 15
(1964) (trial examiner's report adopted by the Board).
70. 1st Cir.-NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696, 701 (1st Cir.
1962). "Certainly the company could reasonably expect the advent of the Union
to affect its already precarious cost picture."
2d Cir.-NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1961).
"The decided cases do not condemn an employer who considers his relationship
with his plant union as only one part of the broad economic picture he must
survey. ...

"

4th Cir.-Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365, 371-72 (4th
Cir. 1954). But see dissent, Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682, 687,
691 (4th Cir. 1963).
6th Cir.-NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 909 (1961); NLRB v. R. C. Mahon Co., 269 F.2d 44, 47 (6th Cir.
1959) ; NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1955). Cf.
Quality Castings Co., v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 36, 41 (6th Cir. 1963).
7th Cir.-Jay Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 292 F2d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1961). "An
employer has a right to consider objectively and independently the economic
impact of unionization of his shop and to manage his business accordingly."
9th Cir.-Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74, 84 (9th
Cir. 1960) (by implication). "That protected union activity is the direct cause
of a business condition upon which an employer actually predicates discrimination among his employees does not mean that the basis for discrimination is the
protected union activity."
In accord with these cases is Phillips v. Burlington Industries, 199 F. Supp.
589, 592 (N.D. Ga. 1961).
If Congress had meant to say what the Board says it meant, subsection
[(a) (3)] would have read: 'To discriminate in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment because of labor
organization membership or activities.'
Ward, "Discrimination"under the National Labor Relations Act, 48 YALE L.J.
1152, 1156-57 (1939).
71. The basic purpose and design of Congress in the Act was to protect employees in their right to organize collectively and to better their working
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The Board in finding discrimination has a tendency to emphasize the effect of the employer's action upon his employees rather
than his intent.7 2 Their concept of discrimination appears to be,
not the intentional discrimination generally embraced by the
courts of appeals but rather discrimination without sufficient
reason, not discrimination in order to discourage union membership but discrimination because of union membership.7 8 This is
contrary to the position usually taken by the courts of appeals,
who have generally based their decisions upon the motive of the
employer, not what it may appear to have been either to the
74
victim or to the union.
It is the policy of the Board that, while an employer might
anticipate that increased costs might flow from unionization,
he may not act upon his anticipation until he has first bargained
75
with the victorious union.
An employer who has afforded his employees their full statutory rights and has bargained in good faith, and then
conditions. Although the employees decision to organize may result in
economic expense to their employer, Congress cannot have intended to permit the employer for that reason to take anticipatory action and to nip
such organization in the bud.
Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162 (1957), enf'd per curiam, NLRB
v. Mackneish 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959). See Ethel J. Hinz, 140 N.L.R.B.
232, 234 n.8 (1962), in which the Board interpreted Rapid Bindery and hising
(sura note 70) as cases where "the preponderant motive for the acceleration
was business necessity; that is, reasonably anticipated increased costs, including
the cost which might result from unionization of employees." The Board, however, respectfully disagreed with the holding of these two cases. See note 67
.rupra.
72. See, e.g., Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 170 (1957),
enfjd per curiant, NLRB v. Mackneish, 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959). See note
67 mpra.
73. Judge Friendly dissenting in NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172,
180, 181 (2d Cir. 1963), embraces the view of the Board partially by stating
that Congress neither said to discriminate because of union membership or to
discriminate in order to discourage union membership. Instead, he would interpret "to discriminate" as meaning "to distinguish or differentiate without sufficient reason." However, if the economic impact of unionization is not a
"sufficient reason," then the practical effect of this test is to prohibit discrimination because of union membership or activity.
74. NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886, 897 (5th Cir. 1962).
75. E.g., Morrison Cafeterias Consol. Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 15 (1964);
Star Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 678 (1963), enforcement denied, NLRB v. Neiderman, 334 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1964); Ethel J. Hinz, 140 N.L.R.B. 232 (1962).
This is to be distinguished from the case where an already unionized employer
is beset by inflexible union demands and moves his plant, subcontracts, or closes.
See Israel Traub, 145 N.L.R.B. 682 (1963). The HARvARD LAw REVIEW concurs with the Board's belief that the employees should be allowed to demonstrate "that the advantages of organization can be attained without undue economic burden to the employer. Accordingly, the employer should be required
to wait to see what terms the union will demand." Note, 77 HARv. L. REv.
1100, 1101 (1964).
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changes or discontinues operations in the belief that he is
financially unable to withstand or meet their union's economic demands, violates no proscription contained in the
76
Act.
It also appears probable that, even after bargaining in good
faith, the Board would require an employer to show that he was
actually financially unable to pay the increased ceosts of unionism
rather than merely that he could invest his capital more wisely
elsewhere. 77 Therefore, despite the reasoning of six courts of
appeals that an employer may anticipate the increased costs of
unionization,78 the Board recognizes unionization as an economic
consideration only when the increased costs are, for all practical
purposes, fully realized.
The Supreme Court has long recognized two distinct types of
discrimination under 8(a) (3): (1) discrimination through
unlawful motive and (2) a narrowly confined7 9 area of discrimination regardless of motive or inherent discrimination. The
Board has developed a third.80 Their discrimination without
76. Morrison Cafeterias Consol., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 56 L.R.R.M.
1483, 1484-85 n.16 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
77. See, e.g., Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.I.B. 547, 551-52 (1961). Although the employer was faced with a demand by the union that it sign a new
contract which would have increased costs more than double the amount of his
previous year's net profits, the Board determined that the employer could have
afforded to continue to operate under the old contract. Since the union had
not threatened economic action to compel adoption of the new contract, the
Board concluded that there was "no basis" in the record for inferring that economic considerations motivated the employer. Id. at 552. (Emphasis added.)
78. The courts have used different terminology in allowing an employer to
anticipate increased costs of unionization, leaving some doubt as to how much
leeway will be allowed an employer in this area. While Jay Foods, Inc. v.
NLRB, 292 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1961) and NLRB v. New England Web,
Inc., 309 F.2d 696, 701 (1st Cir. 1962) indicate that an employer may "reasonably" anticipate increased costs of unionization, NLRB v. R. C. Mahon Co.,
269 F.2d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 1959) and NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d
324, 327 (6th Cir. 1955) speak of the employer's "practical choice" of paying
increased wages or shutting down. This leaves some question as to whether an
employer who is not faced with immediate demands by the union may anticipate
increased costs over a longer period.
Relocation based on economic antiunion bias should be an unfair labor
practice where the employer merely anticipates increased costs because of
organization but not where a recognized union has demonstrated its intention to impose actual increases in cost.
Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1100, 1101 (1964).

79. See Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 680
(1961) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan).
80. The conclusion that the application of the "but for" causation concept of
discrimination will necessarily indicate an employer's intent may possibly work
in the case of a discharge of an individual employee. Cf. NLRB v. Jones Sausage Co., 257 F.2d 878, 881 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. Rv.1, 22 (1947). However, it
obviously does not follow that in other cases the external cause of an employer's
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sufficient reason, or discrimination because of union membership or activity, like inherent discrimination, is based on foreseeability of discouragement. Yet, unlike inherent discrimination, it encompasses discrimination against, as well as discrimination among, employees. 81 Also, and more importantly, it does
not conform to the requirement of a complete lack of significant
economic justification expressed by the Court in American Ship
Building Co. v. ATLRB8 2 and NLRB v. Brown.s8 And finally,
while in some cases it does have the salubrious effect of encouraging collective bargaining, it often condemns the act of employers
who are seeking only to protect their own legitimate interests
and who do not intend in the least to infringe upon the rights of
their employees.
In Darlington,the Supreme Court rejected the Board's view
at least as far as it applies to a partial liquidation by holding
that such an action violates section 8(a) (3) only if it is "motivated by a purpose to chill unionism."8 4 The basic rationale of
the Darlingtoncase is that 8(a) (3) prohibits the discriminatory
use of economic weapons as a lever to obtain future benefits by
discouraging future collective employee activities.8 5 It is therefore probable, though not necessarily certain, that this holding
would apply to plant removals, temporary closures, and other
business changes as well.8 6
action is necessarily indicative of what he intends to accomplish by his actions.
Though the unionization of his plant is admittedly the cause of his actions, he
may still be "actuated by a desire to protect a recognized interest"--his profits.
(Quoted material is taken from Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. Rtv. 1, 20-21 (1947).)
81. See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
82. 85 Sup. Ct. 955 (1965).
83. 85 Sup. Ct. 980 (1965).
84. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 994, 1002 (1965).
Darlington requires that the employer intend to "chill" unionism among his
remainig employees (employees in plants other than the one which he liquidated) and also that he "reasonably have foreseen that such closing will likely
have that effect." Ibid.
85. One of the purposes of the Labor Act is to prohibit the discriminatory
use of economic weapons in an effort to obtain future benefits. The discriminatory lockout designed to destroy a union, like a "runaway shop,"
is a lever which has been used to discourage collective union activities in
the future. But a complete liquidation of a business yields no such future
benefit for the employer, if the termination is bona fide.
Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 85 Sup. Ct 994, 1000 (1965).
86. Mr. Justice Harlan states that employer action which has the foreseeable
consequence of discouraging concerted activities "generally" does not constitute
a violation of §8(a) (3) "in the absence of a showing of motivation which is
aimed at achieving the prohibited effect." Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg.
Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 994, 1003 (1965). Since the "generally" limitation is referred
to a discussion of the "inherently discriminatory" activities of Erie Resistor
and Radio Officers' (see the Court's note 22 referring to note 10), it follows,
especially in light of the development of the law in this area, that this was
the only exception intended. .Expressio unias est exclusio alterius.
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F. PartialMotivation
Another area in which the Board and the courts of appeals
have taken somewhat divergent approaches is the problem of
dual or partial motivation. The Board in Darlingtonheld that a

plant shutdown that is partly motivated by an intent to discourage unionism constitutes an unfair labor practice.8 7 Again
the courts of appeals predominantly disagree. Although there
are statements in several cases which appear to support the
Board's position,88 it appears that they are merely recognizing
the Board's familiar doctrine that the mere existence of a just
cause for a discharge or plant shutdown is not a justification if
it is not acted on."9 The predominant number of cases discussing
this issue have used language indicating that the anti-union
motive must be "substantial" or must "weigh more heavily" in
the decision than the economic reasons.90
87. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 246 (1962). To the same effect
is an earlier statement of the Board that an employer violates § 8(a) (3)
if his action is not taken solely for economic reasons. NLRB 26th Ann. Rep.
97 (1961).
88. See NLRB v: Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., 341 F.2d 725, 728 (2d
Cir. 1965); General Tire, Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F2d 58, 60 (5th Cir. 1964);
NLRB v. Symons Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 1964) ; Town & Country Mfg.Co. v. NLRB, 316 F. 2d 846, 847 (5th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Jamestown Sterling Corp., 211 F.2d 725, 726 (2d Cir. 1954).
Moreover, respondent would be in violation if the selection of the Union
by the clerks was a contributing factor in itsdecision to subcontract the
work.
NLRB v. National Food Stores, Inc., 332 F.2d 249, 252 (7th Cir. 1964).
And even though the discharge may have been based upon other reasons
as well, if the employer was partly motivated by union activity, the discharges were violative of the act.
NLRB v. Great E. Color Lithographic Corp., 309 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1962).
89. Apparently the Board does not, or at one time did not, recognize the
distinction. See Ward, "Discrimination" under the National Labor Relations
Act, 48 YALE LJ. 1152, 1164 (1939).
90. Predominant iotive-NLRB v. Kingsford, 313 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir.
1963).
Substantial or motivating reason-NLRB v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp.,
321 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 204 F.2d
883, 885 (1st Cir. 1953).
Weigh more heavily-Nachman Corp. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir.
1964); NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 204 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1953).
True purpose or real motive-Wonder State Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d
737, 738 (6th Cir. 1964) ; NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886,
896 (5th Cir. 1962); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74,
77 (9th Cir. 1960) ; NLRB v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 189 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir.
1951); NLRB v. Electric City Dyeing Co., 178 F.2d 980, 982 (3d Cir. 1949).
Moving cause-NLRB v. Solo Cup Co., 237 F.2d 521, 525 (8th Cir. 1956);
Wells, Inc. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1947).
Primarily Motivated-NLRB v. Neiderman, 334 F.2d 601, 604 (2d Cir.
1964); NLRB v. Winchester Electronics, Inc., 295 F.2d 288, 292 (2d Cir.
1961); NLRB v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 293 F.2d 300, 309 (5th Cir.
1961).
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Although this supposed divergence has been expressly recognized in at least one case, 91 the difference is more apparent than
real. The Supreme Court has continually recognized that it
is the employer's "true purpose" or the "real motive" that is
controlling9 2 and has said that the Board must find that the
employer's conduct was "primarily" motivated by anti-union
animus. 93 Further it appears that despite the language used the
courts of appeals have followed this test, enforcing the Board's
orders when their findings are supported by substantial evidence
and denying enforcement when they are not.
The one danger of the Board's test is that it might circumvent
the Supreme Courts' admonition in Universal Camera9" that a
court of appeals must view the record as a whole, taking into
account not only that evidence which supports the Board's position but also that which detracts from its weight. If so, it may
happen that an employer who has unquestionably acted for economic reasons may be held to violate section 8(a) (3) merely
because he was not at the same time overly enthusiastic about the
prospect of unionization. It could also lead to the rather novel
conclusion that an employer, having once expressed anti-union
sentiment, is then incapable of making a purely business decision.
G. Conohwion
Recognizing the difficulty that the Board and the courts of
appeals have had in navigating the murky waters of section
8(a) (3), the Supreme Court from time to time has thrown up a
few stars for them to steer by. The Darlingtoncase is a fitting
example. It settled the employer's absolute right to go completely
out of business in the affirmative and his absolute right to go
partially out of business in the negative. In so doing it has also
given some much needed clarity to the motivation factor in 8(a)
(3) discrimination. Nevertheless, the Board has declared its
intention to adhere to its objective theory of motivation until the
91. See Tompkins Motor Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 337 F2d 325, 330 (6th Cir.
1964). See also Note, 48 CORNELL L. Rzv. 572, 575-76 (1963).
92. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961);
Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-44 (1954) ; Associated Press
v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) ; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,

301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937).
93. NLRB v. Brown, 85 Sup. Ct. 980, 986 (1965).
94. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). To the
same effect is NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 832-33 (1962).
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Supreme Court declares otherwise, 5 and it appears unlikely
that they will interpret the Darlington decision as a complete
rejection of this concept as it applies to all 8(a) (3) cases.
The requirement that the courts of appeals accept all findings
of the Board that are supported by substantial evidence necessitates that both the Board and the courts of appeals speak the
same language. Therefore, it is greatly to be desired that the Supreme Court shed more light on the motivation problem -when
the next opportunity presents itself. Otherwise it is likely that
the Board and the courts of appeals will continue to pass each
other like ships in the dark, the Board speaking of "motive" in
terms of causation and the courts of appeals denying enforcement for lack of substantial evidence. The voice is the voice of
Jacob, but the hands are the hands of Esau.
J. KENDALL F w

95. See Morrison Cafeterias Consol., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 56 L.R.R.M.
1483, 1485 (1964) (trial examiner's report adopted by the Board); Ethel J.
Hinz, 140 N.L.R.B. 232, 234 n.8 (1962);

N.L.R.B. 840, 842 n.4 (1962).
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TAX-BUSINESS EXPENSE-DEDUCTION ALLOWED
FOR EXPENSE INCURRED IN ENTERTAINING
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES*
Dukehart-Hughes Tractor c Equip. Co. v. United States,'
entertained in the United States Court of Claims, concerned an
Iowa firm which sought a refund of corporate income taxes on
the grounds that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue erred in
disallowing certain entertainment deductions claimed by the
company under section 162(c) of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code. 2 In disallowing these deductions, the Commissioner contended that the taxpayer's entertainment expenses were not
directly related to its business activities as required by section
274 of the Code."
The plaintiff was a heavy construction equipment company
which received about one-fourth of its gross income from the
sales of machinery to municipal, county and state agencies in
Iowa.
As was customary in the industry, it was the plaintiff's policy
to entertain prospective buyers, including employees of government purchasing departments in various ways, such as fishing
trips, transportation and tickets to athletic contests, hospitality
rooms at conventions, tickets for state fairs, dinners, and golf
tournaments. Christmas gifts were also given to many buyers
but normally cost less than five dollars each. All prospective
customers were entertained in some manner, with no distinctions
made on the basis of past business transactions. As the plaintiff
* Dukehart-Hughes Tractor & Equip. Co. v. United States (Ct. Cl. 1965).

1. 341 F.2d 613 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
2. Trade or Business Expenses.
(a) In General-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business.

Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162.

3. Disallowance of Certain Entertainment, Etc., Expenses.
(a) Entertainment, amusement or recreation.
(1) In General-No deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed for any item.

A. Activity-with respect to an activity which is of a type generally considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or

recreation, unless the taxpayer establishes that the item was
directly related to, or, in the case of an item directly pro-

ceeding or following a substantial and bona fide business

discussion (including business meetings at a convention or
otherwise) that such item was associated with, the active
conduct of the tax payer's trade or business....

Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §274.
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did not advertise, its only method of encouraging potential sales
was through personal contacts and entertainment of prospective
customers.
In Dukehart-Hugies the questions the court had to decide
were whether or not these entertainment expenditures were
"ordinary and necessary" within the meaning of section 162,
and, if so, whether the practice frustrated public policy. To date,
despite much effort, courts have failed to establish definite
criteria to determine whether a given expenditure is in conformity with section 162.
In order to be considered "ordinary and necessary," an entertainment expenditure must be related to the taxpayer's business
and the deductions "must have a proximate relation to the taxpayer's trade or business and must be of a character reasonably
expected to benefit the trade or business." 4 The mere fact that
the entertainment aids in meeting prospective clients does not
in itself make an expense "ordinary and necessary." 5 The remote
possibility of some future sale is not enough to support the deduction of entertainment expenses. Thus, deducting the expense
of maintaining a race horse which bore the owner's name was
disallowed as the court thought that the expenditure was made
for the individual's private pleasure rather than for any benefit
to his business." Generally, there is only the requirement that
the expenditures be in some way sufficiently related or helpful
7
to the business.
Of the words "ordinary and necessary," the word "necessary,"
when related to an expense, can be simply defined as "an expenditure that is appropriate and helpful in developing and maintaining the taxpayer's business." However, "necessary" is not
the only criterion. To be deductible, an expense must be "ordinary" as well as "necessary." These words are not synonymous.
Indeed, the most difficulty stems from the word "ordinary."
This difficulty arises from attempting to apply the fixed standards of section 162 to all types of business activities. To be effective, such standards must vary with the type of business and
the expenditure under the court's consideration. 9
4. 2 CCH 1965

STAND.

FED. TAX REP. 97 1 1340.2661.

5. Lucien W. Rolland, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Merm. 702, 706 (1959).
6. James Schultz, 16 T.C. 401, 406 (1951).

7. 54 HARv. L. Rxv. 853 (1941).
8. 4

MERTENS, FEDERAL

INCoME

TAXATiON

§ 25.09, at 24 (1960).

9. Id. at 26.
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"Ordinary," as used in section 162, means an expense which
is ordinary as evidenced by the common usage of the community
at large or a particular class in the community. The expense can
not be "ordinary" to only one man. 10 However, an expense may
be ordinary though it happens only once in the taxpayer's lifetime,' but it must be "ordinary" in his business community.
To determine what is ordinary in the activities of a particular
business, every aspect of the business must be considered by the
court.'- In attempting to do this, courts have developed two
major guidelines. The first is the principle of "economic reality"
which states that the economic "obligations imposed by the
usages of trade and the requirements of good business are compelling" 13 in determining the necessity of an expense. In other
words, any essential expenditure required by business and not
contrary to public policy is ordinary. This concept places the
burden of proving the absolute necessity of an expenditure on
the taxpayer and leaves the court in the unfortunate position
of having to pass judgment on a businessman's decisions, for
which the court is often unsuited.
The second principle is known as the "hard-headed businessman" test. In applying this test, the court inquires whether an
imaginary, but typical, businessman would have made the same
business expenditures. This test is not unlike the "reasonable
man" standard found in torts.
The hardheaded businessman formula undoubtedly simplifies the application of the necessity test to particular cases
and excludes the "bizarre analogies" which the Supreme
Court was afraid might be offered for acceptance in cases
of expenditures for education, reinstatement of reputation
and the like. The suggested test is supported also on the
ground that the payments made to establish reputation and
learning are akin to capital assets and accordingly might not
be deductible on the general ground applicable to payments
made in acquiring capital assets which have a life of more
than a year. 14
10. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
11. Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940).
12. See Robinson Land & Lumber Co. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 33

(S.D. Ala. 1953).
13. Canton Cotton Mills v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 561 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
14. 4 MmTzns, op. cit. s'upra, note 8, at 34.
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As the above quotation points out, this test is designed to eliminate deductions for self-improvement projects that are only
incidentally related either to the taxpayer's business or to the
establishment of good will.
Obviously then, there exists no uniform standard by which
the court can determine which expenditure is "ordinary and
necessary." The court in solving the individual problems must
apply its total knowledge and experience to the problem, for
there exists no simple "verbal formula that will supply a touchstone." 15 It is readily apparent that each case must stand on its
own peculiar circumstances and merits.' 6
Once the court determines that a taxpayer's entertainment
expenditures are "ordinary and necessary," the question of public
policy still remains. In many instances ordinary and necessary
expenditures are disallowed because a public policy is contravened. A finding of necessity cannot uphold the deduction when
such a finding would frustrate sharply defined national or state
policies.' 7 After much litigation the courts have arrived at a
fairly clear policy which was stated by the United States Supreme Court. In order for a deduction of a business expense to
be denied as a matter of public policy, the policies frustrated
must be national or state policies prescribing particular types of
conduct evidenced by some governmental declaration.'" Business
ethics or community feelings do not seem to be regarded as
sufficient to justify a court's disallowance of an expenditure.
Deductions will not be disallowed merely because the expenditure contravenes public feelings of propriety and custom. 19 This
rule strongly indicates that in order to find a contravention of
public policy the court must find a definite and specific prohi20
bition against the expenditure in state or federal statutes.
Although the circumstances surrounding a given expenditure
border on illegality and are perhaps to be frowned upon, these
circumstances must more than approximate an illegal act in order
to make the expenditure non-deductible. 21 However, once the
15. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1943).

16. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943); Woble v. United
States, 267 F.2d 605, 607 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 391 (1960);
Jones v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1957).
17. See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958);
Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958); United
States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1958).
18. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 96 (1952).
19. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
20. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
21. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
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contravention of a public policy is found, no amount of proof
that the practice is customary or even necessary to the continuance of the business will support a plea for deduction. 22
A good example of this distinction is in the area of rebates
and kickbacks. Although rebates and kickbacks are not regarded
as being among the most praiseworthy practices, morally or
ethically, the courts have allowed deductions for this sort of
28
expenditure as long as there is no conflict with any statute.
Dukelart-Ilughes deals with a rather specialized area of public policy. It involves the entertaining of government employees
by a private company seeking contracts with government agencies. The overwhelming number of cases have held that entertainment of government employees by private concerns is against
public policy. 24 In Bay v. Davidson25 a member of the town
22. In the case of Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc., 25 T.C. 43 (1955), the
petitioners, an insurance company, paid Illinois automobile sellers a commission
in return for the sellers referring their buyers to the petitioners. Although
this was the common practice and necessary in order for the petitioners to
continue in business, the court held that their expense was non-deductible as
there was an Illinois statute prohibiting such dealings.
23. An Ohio insurance agent paid for promoting credit loans to auto dealers
and their customers. This was held to be deductible since it was the common
practice and was not against Ohio law. E. T. Kirtz, 304 F.2d 460 (6th Cir.
1962?. Accord, Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1958); Richardson v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 400, 401, (4th Cir. 1959); Fiambolis v. United States, 152
F. Supp. 10 (1957); But cf. United Draperies, Inc., v. Commissioner, 340
F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1964). Rebates paid to employees of company's customer
were not deductible, even though this practice was necessary to appellant's
business. The court based its decision on grounds that this practice was not
ordinary in that other companies did not pay rebates. The court did not base
its ruling on the actual practice of giving rebates and kickbacks.
Since payments for innocuous forms of commercial bribery have been
held deductible, cases involving the more interesting variations must be
justified in terms of policy; this is certainly the only explanation of cases
disallowing sales commissions where the salesman is hired to use personal
influence in securing public contracts.
54 H. Rv. L. REv. 853, 857 (1941).
One of the more interesting aspects of whether or not a deduction is adverse
to public policy is in the area of a taxpayer's deduction of trial expenses. 49
Ors. S. C. ATr'Y GEN. 263 (1949). "If a taxpayer incurs attorney's fees and
other costs in defending actions against him for violating the O.P.A. law or
regulations ... and no penalties are assessed against him, such fees are a proper
deduction for income tax purposes." There seems to be a double penalty for
being found guilty of a civil or criminal violation. Apparently the taxpaper
is required to anticipate accurately the outcome of a trial before expending
attorney's fees. See Gould Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.
1934), contra, Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943) ; See generally
72 YALE L.J. 108 (1963).
24. E.g., Finley v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 128, 134 (10th Cir. 1958); Cohen
v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949); Harden Mortgage Loan Co.
v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 282, 284 (10th Cir. 1943), cert. denied 320 U.S. 791
(1943); Rugal v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1942); Bay v.
Davidson, 133 Iowa 688, 111 N.W. 25 (1907); Cecil I. Haas, 12 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1117 (1953); Raymond T. Flanagan, 47 B.T.A. 782 (1942).
25. 133 Iowa 688, 111 N.W. 25 (1907).
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council made a sales contract with the municipal government.
Finding the contract to be against public policy, the court said:
"It matters not if he made his private interests subservient to
his public duties. '2 6 In Raymond T. Flanagm2 7 petitioner, a
contractor, customarily entertained government employees, as did
his competitors. The court said: "Such entertainment of public
officials who necessarily have a direct or indirect relation to the
contracts which the petitioner seeks is, speaing generally, commonly regarded as contrary to the public interest."28 Even so
slight and customary an entertainment as lunch for government
employees has been held to be against public policy, although
there was no statute barring this practice. 29 In short, it is readily
apparent that prior to Dukehat-Hughes,the mere fact that there
was a possibility of bribery or corruption of governmental officials was sufficient to cause a disallowance of a deduction.
In deciding for the plaintiff and upholding the deduction,
the court in Dukehart-Hughes relied upon the Supreme Court's
"sharply defined national, or state policies" test. 0 The court
found no such specific prohibition in the related Iowa statutes.3 '
Concurring and dissenting in Dukehart-Hughes, Judge Davis
stated that while the giving of luncheons, free tickets to fairs
and other minor gifts could not be found to frustrate a sharply
defined state policy, he could not agree with the allowing of the
deductions of the larger gifts, such as invitations to golf tournaments and fishing trips. Since these expenses were of such magnitude that the recipient must realize that they were in the nature
of rewards, Judge Davis infers that such gifts would influence
their recipients.
Where does Dukehart-Hughes leave the law? By allowing the
cost of plaintiff's gifts to be deducted, the court has apparently
opened the door to more activity in this area. The problem has
evidently been left to the legislatures for solution. They will have
the burden of forbidding by statute every gift or entertainment
that might be used improperly to influence a government em26. Id at 26.
27. 47 B.T.A. 782 (1942).

28. Id at 783. The court also said "we hold that the deduction is also with-

held by the statute from expenditure by one who is selling materials under
contract with towns and counties for entertaining public officials, even
though it does not appear that the expenditures are repugnant to express
provisions of law."
29. Cecil I. Haas, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 1117 (1953).
30. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
31. IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 738 §§ 739.10, 739.11 & 741.1 (1962).
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ployee. The legislation will have to be very detailed and specific
because enterprising companies seeking to gain a step on their
competitors, will attempt to discover ways not covered by statute
to gain favor with government buyers.
A better solution to the problem is suggested by the dissent.
Judge Davis realizes that entertainment of government employees is now a fact of life and that a line should be drawn
between expenditures which are allowable and those that are
not. Otherwise, it is not unforeseeable that companies seeking
government business will curry the favor of strategically placed
government officials with a veritable shower of gifts. The public
interest demands a more well defined line of demarcation than
that given in Dukehart-IHughes.
EAIRT
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